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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are celebrating their seventy-fifth 
anniversary this year. On this diamond anniversary, the celebration is 
tempered by the uncomfortable truth that for many individuals, the Rules 
are stacked against them. For workers and others challenging 
discrimination through the civil litigation system, the Rules appear less 
like diamonds, and more like diamonds in the rough. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all federal civil actions 
in the same manner, regardless of the substantive right being pursued. In 
other words, the Rules are trans-substantive.
1
 This principle has been a 
central tenet of the civil litigation system since the Rules’ enactment in 
1938.
2
 However, this one-size-fits-all approach to process has been 
increasingly questioned in a society growing in complexity, size, and 
specialization. Developments in the modern civil litigation system have 
led to the devolution of this approach.  
Moreover, it is well established that the Rules have a negative disparate 
impact on certain substantive areas of law and types of cases. The 
language, interpretation, and application of the Rules reveal an undeniable 
pattern of substantive-specific impact. After three-quarters of a century, 
there are enough data points to support this pattern. The blow that 
employment discrimination and civil rights claims have taken at the hands 
of procedural law lays bare any pretense that procedural rules operate in a 
 
 
 1. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) (defining “trans-substantivity”). There are “a few 
minor exceptions.” Id. This Article uses the term “trans-substantivity” to refer to the same rules being 
applied to cases regardless of the underlying substantive rights. This is distinct from the same rules 
being applied to cases regardless of size—another common use of the term. There have been 
significant debate and proposals over non-trans-substantive proposals based on case size, which fall 
outside the scope of this Article. 
 2. Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
535, 536, 543–44 (describing trans-substantivity as a “foundational assumption” of the original Rules). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/8
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neutral fashion. There are numerous pressure points and a myriad of ways 
that such claims have disproportionately suffered. 
The record is replete with examples of how the procedural rules, and 
their application and interpretation, have taken a toll on workplace 
discrimination and civil rights claimants vying for court-entry and merit-
based decisions. For example, as an initial matter, it has become harder for 
claimants to enter the federal court system. The Supreme Court has 
interpreted Rule 8’s pleading requirement in such a way that it forces 
complaints to clear a higher bar to survive dismissal.
3
 The greater risk of 
dismissal compromises enforcement, deterrence, and the right to be heard. 
Depriving access to the civil litigation system undermines fairness, due 
process, and the well-established preference that cases be decided on the 
merits rather than on procedural grounds. 
Another example of disproportionate hardship for claimants 
challenging discriminatory practices is the restrictive application and 
interpretation of Rule 23,
4
 the modern class action rule. Far from simply 
being an intricate joinder device, this aggregation method is designed to 
empower everyday people to promote and enforce public policy. The 
Court’s heightened commonality standard5—like the pleading one—and 
stricter back pay threshold
6
 threaten court access and a formal resolution 
on the merits, but on an even grander scale. The denial of class 
certification—especially in cases involving small value claims and poor 
claimants—can mean the denial of relief altogether for such litigants and 
the underenforcement of anti-discrimination statutes more generally. 
Even when employees and others are successful at class certification, 
their success is often short-lived. No sooner have claimants been approved 
of as a class, than the defendant mounts an interlocutory challenge to 
certification—one it will likely win. 
But plaintiffs permitted to seek class certification are the fortunate 
ones. Arbitration agreements that compel employees to forgo class 
actions—along with other procedural protections—are increasingly 
common in employment contracts and enforced by the courts. Employers 
not able to litigate their way out of class actions may contract their way 
out instead. And if class actions are the only realistic way the law will be 
 
 
 3. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 557–63 (2007).  
 4. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 5. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to 
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441 (2013). 
 6. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2541. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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enforced, employers have effectively contracted for immunity. In sum, the 
elevated class action hurdles jeopardize law enforcement, employer 
deterrence, and employee compensation for Title VII cases. 
Other examples of procedural mechanisms that haven fallen more 
harshly on civil rights litigants include a liberalized summary judgment 
standard,
7
 erosion of the breadth and depth of discovery, harsher 
application of Rule 11, and more rigorous treatment of expert testimony. 
All of these make it easier for defendants to dispose of cases before a 
determination on the merits. 
In sum, since the Rules’ origination, and certainly over the last quarter-
century, there has been a growing shift away from court access,
8
 
particularly for civil rights and workplace discrimination cases.
9
 This 
access to justice problem stems from numerous developments, including: a 
higher pleading standard; stricter class certification; greater deference to 
arbitration agreements; and more liberal grants of summary judgment.
10
 
While any one of these developments alone would present a formidable 
challenge to plaintiffs, the confluence of them is tantamount to a sea 
change. 
It may be true that some procedural rules—purely ministerial in 
nature—will affect cases alleging different substantive rights unequally. 
This is not surprising, nor inherently wrong. What is wrong is when the 
burden falls consistently and more heavily on a distinct class of claims and 
claimants—as it does for employment discrimination and civil rights 
claims and their litigants. That wrong is exacerbated when the substantive 
claims and their proponents are those society has decided—as a policy 
matter—to afford special consideration and protection because of centuries 
of historical and modern subordination. Given the centrality of rule trans-
substantivity in the civil litigation system and the open secret that it is 
 
 
 7. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (holding that the moving party need 
not “support its [summary judgment] motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the 
opponent’s claim”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (holding that 
substantive evidentiary standard at trial applies at summary judgment stage); Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (imposing a plausibility standard to summary 
judgment context). 
 8. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 309–10 (2013) 
(describing “procedural stop signs” that have undermined court access); A. Benjamin Spencer, The 
Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 358–66 (2010). 
 9. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 
519–22 (2010). 
 10. See Miller, supra note 8, at 310–47; A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil 
Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1737 (2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/8
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significantly flawed—because of its unfair impact on workplace and civil 
rights claims—it is time for a change.  
Part I of the Article briefly describes the evolution, justifications, and 
critiques of rule trans-substantivity. Part II explains how the language, 
interpretation, and application of the Rules have undercut court entry and 
merit-based decisions for those alleging employment discrimination and 
civil rights violations. Part III contends that the legitimacy of trans-
substantivity is in jeopardy and proposes some ways that the bench, bar, 
and public may reconcile a trans-substantive process system with a robust 
democracy. 
I. TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY 
Trans-substantivity—the principle that the federal procedural rules 
apply to all cases regardless of the underlying substantive rights at 
issue
11—has been a fundamental principle of the civil litigation system 
since the Rules’ origination in 1938.12 
From their inception, the Rules were intended to facilitate resolution on 
the merits.
13
 Process yielded to substance and the Rules were merely the 
vehicle through which important policies were enforced and democracy 
worked.
14
 The purported neutrality of the Rules gave license to court-
supervised rulemaking, which occurred outside of the formal political 
process.
15
 Promulgation of rules evenly applied across substantive areas 
enabled the Supreme Court rather than Congress to engage in rulemaking 
without offending the democratic process.
16
 Thus, trans-substantivity 
legitimized the allocation of rulemaking power to the courts and 
substantive policy-making power to the legislature.
17
 And the Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934 checked this power-sharing arrangement by 
 
 
 11. Marcus, supra note 1, at 376 (defining “trans-substantivity”). 
 12. Burbank, supra note 2, at 536, 543–44. 
 13. Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 542 
(1925) (“It is a means to an end, not an end in itself . . . .”).  
 14. See id. at 519 (role of the procedural rules is “to aid in the efficient application of the 
substantive law”); Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938) 
(explaining “rules of procedure” must be “continually restricted to their proper and subordinate role[,] 
to the ends of substantive justice”); see also Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of 
Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1170 (2006) (noting the 1938 Rule drafters “viewed the 
design of procedural rules as primarily an engineering task devoid of substantive policy choice, and 
viewed judges as engineering experts in matters of procedural design”). 
 15. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 396. 
 16. See id. at 398, 417–19. 
 17. See id. at 374–75, 398, 416. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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forbidding courts from enacting rules that would “abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right.”18 
The drafters of the Rules deliberately chose a trans-substantive civil 
litigation system.
19
 They sought to simplify a system that had been mired 
in writs dictating different procedures for different causes of action in the 
common law courts.
20
 With the merger of common law and equity courts, 
the rigidity and formality of the writs were abandoned.
 21
 In their stead, all 
courts acquired greater flexibility and discretion—attributes adopted from 
equity.
22
 A uniform set of procedural rules was not only easier for lawyers 
and judges to learn and to apply,
23
 it consequently made the civil litigation 
system more accessible.
24
 Thus, trans-substantivity did not simply make 
the law more uniform and predictable, but more democratic. 
Trans-substantivity, however, has not been a panacea.
25
 To the 
contrary, trans-substantivity creates certain inefficiencies. For example, 
robust discovery rules may cast too wide a net in cases where little, if any, 
discovery is needed.
26
 Trans-substantive rules—designed for general 
consumption—are admittedly blunt instruments designed for rough 
justice. Their contours make them fair game for manipulation and abuse.
27
 
Time and resources are wasted as a result of such loss of focus and 
precision.
28
 As a consequence of such inefficiencies, one tradeoff is 
 
 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). Of course, the line between what constitutes substance and 
procedure has proven less stark and has resulted in robust debate. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 399–
400 (describing historical debate over “the substance-procedure dichotomy” and citing sources).  
 19. Steven N. Subrin, The Limits of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the 
“One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378–79 (2010). 
 20. Id. at 379–82. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 386. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the law and equity 
systems, see id. at 380–81, 387–88.  
 23. Id. at 387. Drafting one set of rules—as opposed to several—is arguably more practical as 
well. See id. 388; see also id. at 383 (“[I]t took the English centuries to evolve to the different writs 
with their different procedural incidents.”). 
 24. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 354 n.6; One Size Fits All, supra note 16, at 387–88. 
 25. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 388 (noting “substantial cost” and years of writing “about the 
detriments of this wide-open procedural system”). 
 26. Marcus, supra note 1, at 416–17. 
 27. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 19, at 388 (discussing how “the widest array of discovery 
possibilities in litigation known to humankind” irresistibly tempts lawyers to expand litigation for 
strategic reasons and “income maximization”). 
 28. Id. at 388–89. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/8
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increased and unfettered judicial discretion
29—vulnerable to partiality and 
seldom overturned on appeal.
30
 
The one-size-fits-all approach to process in the civil litigation system is 
increasingly suspect in a society far more complex, specialized, and larger 
than ever before.
31
 Developments in the modern civil litigation system 
have led to the breakdown of trans-substantivity.
32
 Congress
33
 and state 
legislatures
34
 have enacted substance-specific procedural reforms.
 
Courts 
have not applied the Federal Rules uniformly
35—a practice that can be 
interpreted at best as judicial discretion and adaptation,
36
 or at worst as 
 
 
 29. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474 
(1987) (“Many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-
substantive in only the most trivial sense.”). 
 30. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 391. Professor Stephen N. Subrin also credits trans-
substantivity with increased settlements and a consequent reduction in trials. Id. at 393. 
 31. Marcus, supra note 1, at 372–73. 
 32. Id. at 426; Subrin, supra note 19, at 404. 
 33. Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 
1502 (1992); see, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104–
67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77–78 (2006)); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) 
(2006) (subjecting securities fraud claims to heightened pleading standard); Y2K Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6601–6617 (2006) (subjecting Y2K litigation to heightened pleading); Prison Litigation Reform 
Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3624(b), 3626 and in scattered sections of Titles 28 and 42 (2006)) (heightened pleading 
requirement enacted to reduce prison litigation); see also Marcus, supra note 1, at 404–07 (discussing 
various substance-specific procedural federal law). 
 34. Marcus, supra note 1, at 404, 407–09 (citations omitted) (“[D]ozens of state legislatures have 
departed from the trans-substantivity principle and enacted special pleading requirements for medical 
malpractice cases.”); Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in 
Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 1012–15 (2004) (discussing trans-
substantivity and procedural reforms taken to address medical malpractice litigation). See generally 
Seymour Moskowitz, Discovery in State Civil Procedure: The National Perspective, 35 W. ST. U. L. 
REV. 121, 124–25 (2007) (discussing substance-specific state rules). 
 35. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003) 
(describing imposition of heightened pleading requirement in lower courts); Richard L. Marcus, The 
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 444–
51 (1986) (describing development of elevated pleading standard by lower courts in discrete 
substantive areas, including civil rights); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights 
Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 MO. L. REV. 677, 692 (1984) (discussing the stricter 
pleading requirements adopted for civil rights cases).  
 The Supreme Court pushed back to such lower court adventurism in interpreting the Rule 8 
pleading standard, but ironically engaged in its own overreaching by reinterpreting Rule 8’s criteria 
more restrictively. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 557–63 (2007); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-
Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 65, 73–77, 78–80 (2010). 
 36. For example, following the Supreme Court’s seminal pleadings cases, Twombly and Iqbal—
requiring plaintiffs to put forth sufficient evidence to make a plausible claim to overcome dismissal—
some lower courts vary the amount of factual information required, based on informational asymmetry 
and type of claim. See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(explaining the plaintiffs had a plausible copyright infringement claim, even though “no more 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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judicial hostility and overreaching,
37
 depending on the beholder’s eye.38 
The federal district courts, in their capacity to craft local rules “not 
inconsistent with” the Federal Rules, have also eroded trans-substantivity 
by creating their own “substance-specific” procedure.39 This devolution 
has not gone unnoticed.
40
 
The propriety of trans-substantivity has been the subject of robust 
commentary and debate.
41
 Indeed, twenty-five years after the Rules’ 
 
 
definitive assertion as to lack of permission seems possible when the users remain anonymous”); 
Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1068 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“Due to . . . the asymmetry of 
information between Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding which Defendants actually took, ordered, 
supervised, or approved certain actions, the Court cannot now dismiss any claims [of warrantless 
searches and seizures] . . . .”); Watrous v. Town of Preston, No. 3:10-CV-597, 2011 WL 1743508, at 
*2 (D. Conn. May 3, 2011) (“The plausibility standard does not impose an across-the-board, 
heightened fact pleading standard.”). This flexible approach enabling vulnerable cases to survive Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal rings non-trans-substantivity. 
 37. See Miller, supra note 8, at 334 n.184 (citations omitted) (noting criticism of Court’s 
unilateral revision of the Rules without honoring the rulemaking process); Arthur R. Miller, From 
Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 
90–94 (2010) (“With Twombly and Iqbal, it is quite possible that the Court implicitly abandoned or 
compromised its devotion to the transsubstantive character of the Rules.”). 
 38. See generally Marcus, supra note 1, at 377 (“A number of commentators, generally critical of 
trans-substantivity, argue that the vast discretion the Federal Rules give district judges renders the 
federal system only superficially trans-substantive.”). 
 39. Id. at 377, 414; see Tobias, supra note 33, at 1503–05 (criticizing local rules and related 
experimentation for eroding trans-substantivity); Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 
46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503, 510 (1996) (criticizing local rules for undermining trans-substantivity). But 
see, Marcus, supra note 1, at 414 (“A survey of ten federal districts shows that only about five percent 
of all local rules could arguably be deemed substance-specific.”). The Manual for Complex Litigation, 
“which specifically suggests that judges tailor numerous particular procedures to individual 
complicated lawsuits,” has also been called “a monument to non-trans-substantivity.” Tobias, supra 
note 33, at 1505 (discussing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) §§ 33.1-6 (1985)). 
 40. Tobias, supra note 33, at 1506 (discussing commentators, including Professor Robert Cover 
and former Advisory Committee Reporter, Professor Benjamin Kaplan) (“[F]or a considerable period, 
commentators have been exploring the decline of trans-substantivity.”); see, e.g., Judith Resnik, 
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 526 (1986) (“[T]he premise 
of trans-substantive rules has been silently undermined—de jure and de facto.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 14, at 1159 (noting trans-substantivity may not be the best choice 
because “different substantive policies sometimes justify different procedural choices”); Paul D. 
Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of 
Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2068 (1989) (concluding 
that “judicially-made rules directing courts to proceed differently according to the substantive nature 
of the rights enforced is an idea that has been wisely rejected in the past and must be rejected for the 
present and for the future.”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244–47 (1989) (analyzing critiques 
of the trans-substantivity of the Rules); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects 
for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 776–79 (1993) (critics of trans-substantivity may be 
“making a mountain out of a molehill.”); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on 
Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (2008) (describing limit of trans-substantivity on “war on 
terror” cases and exploring substantive-procedural dichotomy); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over 
Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 841 
(1991) (“Essentially, the disagreement between the participatory advocates and the traditionalists 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/8
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fiftieth anniversary, analysis of the doctrine continues in the same vein. 
The principle continues to come under significant fire because of its 
failure to permit explicit adaptation when the Rules have a negative impact 
on civil rights and their beneficiaries.
42
 Critics have proposed eradicating 
trans-substantivity
43
 and creating substance-specific procedural rules.
44
  
The fiction of rule neutrality is hard to deny.
45
 The language,
46
 
 
 
involves whether the trans-substantive vision of the rules has any continuing vitality or claim to 
legitimacy.”); Subrin, supra note 19, at 377 (“I have argued for three decades that the underlying 
transsubstantive philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is flawed.”); Marcus, supra note 1, 
at 374 (“The embrace of substance-specific procedure highlights the brittleness of trans-substantivity’s 
theoretical underpinnings.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin’s 
New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Problem,” 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 77–
97 (1994) (recognizing the current shortcomings with trans-substantivity); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge 
Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 
FLA. L. REV. 27, 45–56 (1994) (explaining how substance-specific rules could relieve costs and 
pressures on defense attorneys); Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation 
and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1791–1801 (1992) (analyzing whether 
complex litigation conflicts with trans-substantivity). 
 42. Gene R. Shreve, Eighteen Feet of Clay: Thoughts on Phantom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85, 92 
(1991) (footnote omitted) (“Increasingly, civil procedure literature stresses procedure’s impact on 
particular sets of rights or on particular groups. . . . [M]uch contemporary scholarship has disparaged 
trans-substantive approaches . . . .”); Tobias, supra note 33, at 1506, 1508 (noting how legal 
scholarship is “increasingly discredit[ing] the . . . idea that procedure can be applied without fully 
considering its substantive impacts on particular rights [such as civil rights] or specific groups [such as 
minorities]”). See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A 
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 57–99, 158–74 (1979); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights 
and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 642–48 (1986); Eric 
K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 341, 359–81 (1990). 
 43. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 33, at 1508 (footnotes omitted) (“It is entirely too late to 
transfigure trans-substantivity, much less remain transfixed by it, and trans-substantivity should now 
go ‘gentle into that good night.’ The preferable approach is to transcend trans-substantivity, to 
acknowledge candidly its limitations, and to recognize and meet forthrightly the compelling challenge 
of formulating procedures that will efficaciously treat civil litigation in the twenty-first century.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 41, at 41, 45–56 (arguing for less restrictive discovery rules in 
cases that tend to take longer, such as products liability and employment discrimination); id. at 55 
(noting suggestion for “different procedures for different types of cases” by former Reporter to the 
Advisory Committee, Benjamin Kaplan and others). See also Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and 
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716–
17 (1988) (noting a difference between uniformity and trans-substantivity and that certain types of 
cases, such as RICO cases, may need their own particular uniform rules); Stempel, supra note 41, at 
58–60 (same). See generally, Subrin, supra note 41, at 28 n.4 (listing Professor Stephen B. Burbank’s 
scholarship urging modification of transsubstantive procedure). 
 45. Many scholars have debunked the notion of rule neutrality. See Mullenix, supra note 41, at 
823 (noting that “public interest partisans” believe that “there are no such things as ‘facially neutral 
rules’” and that “litigation embodies class, race, gender, and economic struggles”); Judith Resnik, The 
Domanin of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2224–27 (1989) (rejecting notion that rules are applied 
neutrally and evenly to parties); Yamamoto, supra note 42, at 396 (“[S]cholars and jurists generally 
acknowledge now that procedure is neither value-free nor a science.”); id. at 396 nn.258–59 (citing 
sources and noting that “[t]he debate is by no means over” and at times “has been acerbic”). 
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interpretation, and application of the Rules reveal an undeniable pattern of 
substance-specific impact. This reality, exposed over three-quarters of a 
century, belies a blurrier line than the clean trans-substantive and 
substance-specific dichotomy.
47
 Rule creation, translation, and 
enforcement must be recognized for the value-laden enterprise that it is.
48
 
As the original drafters of the Rules, Charles E. Clark and others, 
recognized: even purportedly neutral concepts emanating from the 
procedural rules—like efficiency, accuracy, and access—are “values” 
themselves.
49
 
The critique of the one-size-fits-all approach to civil process has a long 
history and many critics. The principle has already been undermined at the 
margins and now is starting to unravel beyond the seams. As Professor 
Carl Tobias warned almost one quarter century ago, “insofar as 
perpetuation of a trans-substantive theory of the Rules has restricted the 
vindication of underlying substantive rights, trans-substantivity may have 
become the enemy of substance.”50 The next section explores just how 
formidable an opponent trans-substantivity has become for fair 
employment and other civil rights claims and their advocates. 
II. PROCEDURE DISPROPORTIONATELY HARMS EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS 
It is well established that the Rules have a disproportionate adverse 
effect on certain substantive areas of law and kinds of cases. Over the last 
seventy-five years, sufficient evidence
51
 has mounted to demonstrate the 
inequitable toll process has taken in the civil rights and employment 
area.
52
 
 
 
 46. The choice between two procedural options may have very different consequences for the 
realization of certain substantive rights. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 379 (“A choice of one trans-
substantive procedural rule over another, even if made for reasons totally disconnected from any 
particular substantive policy preference, can significantly impact the enjoyment of rights and the 
discharge of duties.”). 
 47. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 378 (“Because procedural rules can have regular, predictable 
impacts that differ by substantive area of litigation, trans-substantivity and substance-specificity are 
ideal types at two ends of a spectrum.”). 
 48. See id. at 379–80 (discussing distinction between substance, procedure, and value-neutrality). 
 49.  See id. at 419; see also id. at 397 (citing Charles E. Clark, Procedural Aspects of the New 
State Independence, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1230, 1234 (1940)). 
 50. Tobias, supra note 33, at 1507; id. at 1508 (“[T]he procedural mechanisms developed and 
applied must facilitate litigants’ vindication of substance, thereby effectuating congressional intent and 
freeing substance from the shackles of procedure.”). 
 51. See discussion infra Part II. 
 52. See Spencer, supra note 5, at 479–80 (footnote omitted) (“From motions for sanctions under 
Rule 11, to summary judgment motions, to pleading standards, employment discrimination claims 
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History has shown how the procedural rules, and their application and 
interpretation, have unfairly taxed workplace discrimination and civil 
rights claimants vying for court-entry and merit-based decisions. Although 
the empirical data available to support this conclusion has at times been 
mixed,
53
 the disputes over impact tend to be more in degree than kind.
54
 
When viewed from a wide-angle lens, the data reveals a distinct pattern of 
court denial and disenfranchisement for workers and others alleging 
discrimination and civil rights violations. This disparate impact of 
pleadings, class actions, and summary judgment, among others, is acutely 
problematic. 
A. Pleadings 
As an initial matter, it has become harder for claimants to enter the 
federal court system. This is because the Supreme Court has interpreted 
Rule 8’s pleading requirement in such a way that claimants have a higher 
bar to clear to survive dismissal. Although applicable to all cases, this bar 
has been particularly formidable for those alleging workplace 
discrimination and civil rights violations. 
Since the inception of the Rules, access was designed to be easy. The 
pleadings requirements were designed to put the parties and the court on 
notice of the basic parameters of a dispute.
55
 Rule 8
56
 and the 
 
 
have faced a gauntlet of procedural hurdles that otherwise do not apply to civil actions.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2002) (noting conflict between Federal Judicial Center and American 
Judicature Society studies on whether civil rights plaintiffs were disproportionately affected by Rule 
11). 
 54. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.a (pleadings) and note 361 (Rule 11). 
 55. The initial drafter of the Federal Rules, Charles E. Clark, set forth “notice pleading”: 
[W]e must decide what we expect of the pleadings . . . . If it is proof of the other fellow’s 
case, that is a vain hope . . . . What we can expect . . . is such a statement of the case as will 
isolate it from all others, so that the parties and the court will know what is the matter in 
dispute, the case can be routed through the court processes to the proper method of trial and 
disposition, and the judgment will be res adjudicata, so that the same matter cannot again be 
litigated. 
Clark, supra note 14, at 316. 
 56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). 
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accompanying forms
57
 illustrate the ease with which a plaintiff was 
expected to plead. 
Consequently, for over half a century, federal courts opened their doors 
to those who could craft a complaint that provided basic notice to the 
defendant of their claims. This threshold, called “notice pleading,” was 
calcified by the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson
58—a civil rights case 
brought by African-American railway workers challenging their union for 
failing to fairly represent their interests without regard to race. This 
seminal case established that a complaint should only be dismissed if the 
plaintiff could “prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief.”59 A plaintiff could easily initiate a lawsuit because 
the system was designed to test the merits of plaintiff’s case later, after 
both sides had the opportunity to collect evidence through the discovery 
process and use other pre-trial procedures.
60
 It was important not to let 
procedural gamesmanship bar ordinary people from seeking justice and 
relief through the courts. Anchored in this principle, the Supreme Court 
initially rejected lower courts’ efforts to raise the pleading standard in civil 
rights cases.
61
 The Court remained resolute in enforcing Conley’s “no set 
of facts” standard, only requiring plaintiffs to set forth a “short and plain 
statement of the claim” to put the defendant on notice, as stated in Rule 
8.
62
 Civil rights complainants were permitted court entry and the 
opportunity for a merits-based resolution. 
After over fifty years, however, the Supreme Court abruptly reversed 
course—bringing liberal pleading to an end. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly,
63
 an antitrust class action by consumers against Internet and 
telephone service providers, the Court retired Conley’s permissive “no set 
 
 
 57. See Clark, supra note 14, at 316. Clark described the forms as illustrative of the simplicity 
expected of the pleadings: 
These forms which I have referred to may prove to be about the most important feature of the 
new rules. They afford the illustrations to show what the words in the rules proper mean, to 
show as Rule 84 states, “the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.” 
Id. 
 58. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 59. Id. at 45–46. 
 60. See Clark, supra note 14, at 318. In drafting the Rules, Charles E. Clark set forth how “notice 
pleading” would work in tandem with discovery and summary judgment: “Attempted use of the 
pleadings as proof is now less necessary than ever with the development of two devices to supply such 
elements of proof as may be necessary before trial. These are discovery and summary judgment, both 
the subject of extensive provisions in the [1938] rules.” Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–515 (2002); Leatherman v. 
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
 62. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–47; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 63. 550 U.S. 554 (2007). 
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of facts” standard.64 Plaintiffs could no longer put forth facts showing their 
claims were possible; instead, they had to put forth facts showing their 
claims were plausible.
65
 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
66
 a constitutional civil rights 
case by Javaid Iqbal against top government officials, the Court clarified 
that the new standard applies to all civil actions, including discrimination 
claims.
67
 
This higher pleadings bar has created a harsher standard for plaintiffs 
challenging discrimination. Intentional discrimination claims,
68
 in 
particular, are more vulnerable to dismissal following Twombly and Iqbal 
for reasons described elsewhere.
69
 This duo has ushered in a new pleading 
paradigm that threatens the viability of potentially meritorious civil rights 
claims because of the potentially adverse impact of the plausibility 
standard. 
1. Excessive Subjectivity 
One problem with the Court’s importation of a plausibility test at the 
pleadings stage is that plausibility should purportedly be determined by 
applying “judicial experience and common sense.”70 The overly subjective 
and vague nature of the test fails to properly guide judges in how to 
determine the plausibility of an intentional discrimination claim pre-
discovery.
71
 Consequently, claims of discrimination are vulnerable to 
interpretations based on differences among judges, rather than the legal 
 
 
 64. Id. at 562–63. 
 65. Id. at 557–63. 
 66. 556 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2009). 
 67. Id.  
 68. For an examination of what evidentiary standard should be required for making a plausible 
showing of disparate impact discrimination to survive dismissal post-Twombly and Iqbal, see Joseph 
A. Seiner, Plausibility and Disparate Impact, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (2013). 
 69. See Malveaux, supra note 35, at 85–101. 
 70. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 71. Access to Justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 17 
(2009) (statement of Arthur Miller, Professor, New York University School of Law) [hereinafter 
Access to Justice Denied] (footnote omitted) (“The subjectivity at the heart of Twombly-Iqbal raises 
the concern that rulings on motions to dismiss may turn on individual ideology regarding the 
underlying substantive law, attitudes toward private enforcement of federal statutes, and resort to 
extra-pleading matters hitherto far beyond the scope of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. As a result, 
inconsistent rulings on virtually identical complaints may well be based on judges’ disparate subjective 
views of what allegations are plausible. Courts already have differed on issues that were once 
settled.”); see also al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Post-Twombly, plaintiffs 
face a higher burden of pleading facts, and courts face greater uncertainty in evaluating complaints.”). 
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sufficiency of such claims.
72
 Predictability, uniformity and clarity are 
subsequently jeopardized.”73 
Case outcomes may reflect, not legal standards, but variances in 
personal perceptions.
74
 For example, studies reveal that there are 
significant differences in perception among racial groups over the extent 
of race discrimination,
75
 especially following the election of Barack 
Obama, the first African-American President.
76
 Consequently, some 
judges, like many Americans, presume that race discrimination is largely 
historical and rare.
77
 This presumption may lead to one judge to 
conclude—based on the facts before him—that intentional discrimination 
is implausible, especially in light of other alternative benign explanations 
 
 
 72. Malveaux, supra note 35, at 93. 
 73. Id. at 92. 
 74. Id at 93; see Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even after Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
473, 499 (2010) (“Different judges with different life experiences can be expected to view plausibility 
differently because they have a different understanding of what is ordinary, commonplace, natural, or a 
matter of common sense.”); id. at 500–03 (describing how judges’ different baseline assumptions may 
lead to differing perceptions of plausibility, especially in discrimination cases). 
 75. See Gary Langer & Peyton M. Craighill, Fewer Call Racism a Major Problem Though 
Discrimination Remains, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Politics/ 
story?id=6674407&page=1 (“[African-Americans] remain twice as likely as whites to call racism a big 
problem (44 percent vs. 22 percent), and only half as likely to say African-Americans have achieved 
equality.”); K.A. DIXON ET AL., JOHN J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR WORKFORCE DEV., A WORKPLACE 
DIVIDED: HOW AMERICANS VIEW DISCRIMINATION AND RACE ON THE JOB 8 (2002), available at 
http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/node/113 (finding that African-American employees are five times 
more likely than their white counterparts to believe that African-Americans are “treated unfairly in the 
workplace”); Kevin Sack & Janet Elder, Appendix, The New York Times Poll on Race: Optimistic 
Outlook But Enduring Racial Division, in HOW RACE IS LIVED IN AMERICA 385 (2001) (44% of 
African-Americans believe they are treated less fairly than whites in the workplace, while 73% of 
whites believe African-Americans are treated fairly). 
 76. Malveaux, supra note 35, at 93–94; see, e.g., PBS Newshour: Debate on Race Emerges as 
Obama’s Policies Take Shape (PBS television broadcast Sept. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec09/rage_09-16.html [hereinafter PBS Newshour]; 
Philip Rucker, In S.C., One Road Divides Two Ways of Thinking, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2009, at A1 
(describing varying opinions on the continued existence of racism after Obama’s election and the role 
of race in opposition to him). 
 77. Malveaux, supra note 35, at 94. For example, in a discussion among columnists and 
academics with Gwen Ifill, Democratic pollster Cornell Belcher concluded:  
We’re two very different countries racially, where right now you have a majority of whites 
who, frankly, do think we’re post-racial because they think African-Americans have the same 
advantages as they do, while African-Americans do not. And you have a large swath of 
whites right now who are just as likely to see reverse discrimination as an issue as classic 
discrimination. 
PBS Newshour, supra note 76. The presumption against intentional race discrimination may have 
actually developed much earlier. See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and 
Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job 
Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1180 (1992) (“After a decade of efforts to enforce Title VII, 
federal judges apparently began to share the general public’s belief that employment discrimination 
against minorities had been largely eradicated.”). 
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available.
78
 The very same facts could lead another judge to just the 
opposite conclusion. Without a more objective metric to apply pre-
discovery, judges are vulnerable to relying on extra-pleading matters when 
evaluating complaints.
79
 
This vulnerability is troubling in light of some courts’ hostility to civil 
rights claims and perception that such cases are largely frivolous.
80
 This 
perception drove a number of federal district courts to routinely impose a 
heightened pleading requirement for such claims.
81
 The Supreme Court 
corrected this practice on numerous occasions,
82
 until it applied its own 
arduous requirement in Iqbal—also a civil rights case.83 
Empirical studies indicate that judicial hostility to Title VII claims 
continues to impact litigation outcomes. For example, in a study analyzing 
federal civil cases from 1970 to 2006, Professors Kevin M. Clermont and 
Stewart J. Schwab found that plaintiffs challenging employment 
discrimination did not fare well in federal court.
84
 In particular, 
“employment discrimination cases constitute one of the least successful 
categories at the district court level, in that plaintiffs win a very small 
 
 
 78. See Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather than Intent, 34 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 675 (2003); see also Access to Justice Denied, supra note 71, at 90 
(statement of Debo P. Adegbile, then-Director of Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense & Education 
Fund) (“Because this new plausibility standard appears dangerously subjective, it could have a 
potentially devastating effect in civil rights cases that come before judges who may, based on the 
nature of their personal experiences, fail to recognize situations in which discrimination or other 
constitutional wrongs require redress.”). 
 79. Malveaux, supra note 35, at 96. 
 80. See, e.g., Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960–61 (D. Conn. 1968) (“A substantial 
number of these cases are frivolous or should be litigated in the State courts; they all cause 
defendants—public officials, policemen and citizens alike—considerable expense, vexation and 
perhaps unfounded notoriety.”). 
 81. Malveaux, supra note 35, at 95; see Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of 
Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 950–51, 
956–57 (1990); see also Maule, 297 F. Supp. at 960–61 (citing cases). Court application of a 
heightened pleading standard for civil rights cases is well documented. See generally A. Benjamin 
Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 HOW. L.J. 99, 104–111 (2008) 
(describing historical application of heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases); Fairman, supra 
note 35, at 1027–32; Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 576 (2002); 
Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1750–52, 
1759 (1998); Wingate, supra note 35, at 688–89. 
 82. Malveaux, supra note 35, at 95; see Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1993) (rejecting heightened pleading requirement for 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claims); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 515 (2002) 
(rejecting heightened pleading requirement for Title VII employment discrimination claim); Jones v. 
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213–14 (2007) (rejecting heightened pleading requirement for prison litigation 
claims). 
 83. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). 
 84. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009). 
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percentage of their actions and fare worse than in almost any other 
category of civil case.”85 In addition, a plaintiff is more likely to lose on 
appeal.
86
 Professors Clermont and Schwab identified an “anti-plaintiff 
effect” that they attribute to negative judicial attitudes toward employment 
cases.
87
 Various scholars have also noted judicial resistance to civil rights 
claims in general.
88
 
In assessing the propriety of a “judicial experience and common sense” 
standard for determining plausibility, empirical studies have been 
instructive. In a study of employment and housing discrimination cases 
conducted by Professor Raymond H. Brescia, he contends that the manner 
in which many judges are using the plausibility standard may differ from 
the Supreme Court’s use in Twombly and Iqbal.89 Judges rarely explicitly 
invoked reliance on judicial “experience and common sense” or outrightly 
dismissed cases on the grounds that there existed an equally plausible legal 
alternative to plaintiff’s case theory.90 To determine how and to what 
extent district court judges were using the plausibility test, Professor 
Brescia examined a subset of ninety-five post-Iqbal cases in which 
motions to dismiss were granted in full with prejudice and solely non-
 
 
 85. Id. at 113. In particular, from 1979 to 2006, the plaintiff success rate before judges for such 
cases was 19.62%, while the plaintiff success rate for other types of cases was 45.53%. Id. at 130. See 
also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases so Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 
560–61 (2001) (indicating that in employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs are “half as successful 
when their cases are tried before a judge than a jury, and success rates are more than fifty percent 
below the rate of other claims”). 
 86. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 84, at 110–11. In particular, from 1988 to 2004, the 
percentage of appeals reversed after plaintiffs’ trial wins was 41.10%, while those after defendants’ 
trial wins was 8.72%. Id. at 110. 
 87. Id. at 115. The perception that civil rights claims are largely frivolous may be fueled in part 
by the significant number of such claims filed by prisoners, a phenomenon which has diminished but 
not disappeared under the PLRA. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597 n.18 (1998) 
(describing drop in prisoner case filings since the enactment of the PLRA). 
 88. John H. Doyle et al., Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on 
Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117, 342 (1997) 
(describing federal judges’ dislike of employment cases); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking 
and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 790 (2005) (“Unfortunately for Title VII 
plaintiffs, the hostility of the federal judiciary to employment discrimination claims has been widely 
recognized.”); Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext 
Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539, 546 (2001) (“[C]ourts will exploit any loopholes provided by the Supreme 
Court to dismiss what they consider to be unmeritorious discrimination suits.”); Leland Ware, 
Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in Employment 
Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 37, 63 (2000) 
(discussing “the reluctance and doubt [by judges] that greet claims asserted by civil rights plaintiffs”); 
Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 575, 585 (2003) (describing 
“unsympathetic” application of Title VII by the courts). 
 89. Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in 
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 240–41 (2011–2012). 
 90. Id. 
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disparate impact claims were raised.
91
 Professor Brescia concluded that 
less than half of these cases explicitly invoked the Twombly and/or Iqbal 
plausibility standard and, when the standard was cited, rarely did district 
courts go beyond boilerplate language.
92
 Professor Brescia found that in 
only four of the ninety-five cases did a court explicitly invoke the “more 
plausible” test, i.e., comparing the plaintiff’s allegations to an alternative 
explanation for defendant’s conduct.93 This could suggest that the vague 
and value-laden pleading paradigm established by the Supreme Court may 
not have fiercely taken hold as some had initially feared. 
Professor’s Brescia’s study is tempered, however, by an established 
and growing literature on the prevalence of cognitive and unconscious bias 
that may be at work. Such literature contends that despite their best efforts, 
judges’ backgrounds and attitudes play a significant role in case 
outcomes.
94
 Before this backdrop, it is not surprising that many judges 
would not flagrantly report that they rely on their judicial experience and 
common sense when assessing the plausibility of a claim or an alternative 
explanation, if they were even aware that they did so. Scientific studies 
also explain how intuition can increase the risk of inaccurate and impartial 
decision-making. They have found that judicial decisions based on 
 
 
 91. Id. at 240–43. 
 92. Id. at 278. 
 93. Id. at 279. 
 94. Legal realists adhere to this notion. See Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 1, 4–5 (1994). Nugent explains:  
Ideally, judges reach their decisions utilizing facts, evidence, and highly constrained legal 
criteria, while putting aside personal biases, attitudes, emotions, and other individuating 
factors. This ideal, however, while appealing to most judges, does not coincide with the 
findings of behavioral scientists, whose research has shown that human beings rarely, if ever, 
conform to such idealistic principles. 
. . . . 
[I]t is exactly through this blind faith in their impartiality that judges may gain a false sense of 
confidence in their decisions. They may fail to take into account the unavoidable influences 
we all experience as human beings and disregard the limits of human nature and the difficulty 
of bringing to the conscious level subjective motivations, beliefs and predilections. 
Id. (footnote omitted). See Hart, supra note 88, at 789 & n.253 (citing literature). See also Howard T. 
Hogan, Some Thoughts on Juries in Civil Cases, 50 A.B.A. J. 752, 753 (1964) (“Our judgment of 
issues of fact must always be based in part upon what we, as individuals [i.e., judges], are—the sum 
total of our experiences, our backgrounds, our prejudices and our limitations.”); Schultz & Petterson 
supra note 77, at 1167 (“There is little disagreement that judges’ political, social, and personal values 
may affect their decisions.”). 
 Formalists, on the other hand, describe judicial decision-making as a mechanical and deliberate 
application of the law to the facts. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1138, 1145–46 (1999); Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: 
Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 420–21 (1992). 
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intuition
95—while beneficial and accurate under some circumstances96—
may also “‘lead to severe and systematic errors’” and biased decision-
making.
97
 In an empirical study of the judicial reasoning and decision-
making of 252 trial judges, along with other studies, the authors 
concluded: 
[I]ntuition is also the likely pathway by which undesirable 
influences, like the race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect 
the legal system. Today, the overwhelming majority of judges in 
America explicitly reject the idea that these factors should influence 
litigants’ treatment in court, but even the most egalitarian among us 
may harbor invidious mental associations.
98
 
The study found that automatic, intuitive judgment is more likely to occur 
than active deliberation when trial judges labor under heavy dockets and 
time pressures.
99
 The authors noted that such intuitive determinations were 
unlikely to be corrected by appellate courts whose oversight is rare and 
limited,
100
 and whose standard of review is deferential to the trial court.
101
 
While recognizing the prevalence of judges’ “best efforts” at making 
 
 
 95. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 43 (2007) (“Despite their best efforts . . . judges, like everyone else, have two cognitive systems for 
making judgments—the intuitive and the deliberative—and the intuitive system appears to have a 
powerful effect on judges’ decision making.”); id. at 6 (“Our results demonstrate that judges, like 
others, commonly make judgments intuitively, rather than reflectively, both generally and in legal 
contexts.”); see also R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1381, 1420 (2006) (“Deciding judicial cases inescapably requires the exercise of intuition.”). See 
generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005). 
 96. Guthrie, supra note 95, at 29 (“The intuitive approach to decision making is quick, effortless, 
and simple, while the deliberative approach to decision making is slow, effortful, and complex. The 
obvious advantage of the former is its speed; judges with heavy dockets can rely on intuition to make 
judgments quickly.”). 
 97. Id. at 31 (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974)); Id. at 43 (“The intuitive approach might work 
well in some cases, but it can lead to erroneous and unjust outcomes in others.”). 
 98. Id. at 31 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 5 (footnote omitted) (“[J]udges are predominantly 
intuitive decision makers, and intuitive judgments are often flawed . . . . [I]ntuition is generally more 
likely than deliberation to lead judges astray. We suspect this happens with some frequency, but even 
if it is uncommon, millions of litigants each year might be adversely affected by judicial overreliance 
on intuition.”). See also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 969, 971 (2006) (explaining how the Implicit Association Test reveals that the majority of people 
make decisions based, at least in part, on biased assumptions of race or gender); Jerry Kang, Trojan 
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1512–14 (2005) (describing implicit bias revealed through 
association tests performed). 
 99. Guthrie, supra note 95, at 35 (footnotes omitted) (“Judges facing cognitive overload due to 
heavy dockets or other on-the-job constraints are more likely to make intuitive rather than deliberative 
decisions because the former are speedier and easier.”). 
 100. Id. at 4–5 & nn.16–17. 
 101. Id. at 32. 
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deliberative decisions,
102
 the study encourages the legal system to take an 
active role in helping judges do this.
103
 
Recognizing that judges may interpret what is plausible through a lens 
informed by background and experience is not to disparage their character 
or suggest they harbor ill will.
104
 It recognizes that judges must guard 
against relying on extrajudicial factors when making rulings based on a 
standard that is excessively subjective or promotes intuitive decision-
making. Acknowledging this vulnerability and establishing a more 
objective and clear standard for determining the legal sufficiency of a 
complaint would guard against such disparate impact and realign process 
with democracy. 
2. Informational Asymmetry 
Another problem with the Court’s importation of a plausibility test at 
the pleadings stage is the difficulty of unearthing evidence of 
discriminatory intent prior to discovery. Demonstrating a plausible claim 
of intentional discrimination at this early stage of litigation can be 
difficult—if not impossible.105 This is because discrimination has become 
more subtle and institutional—taking on the form of stereotypes and 
unconscious bias, discussed above.
106
 Its covert nature makes 
discrimination harder to expose at this juncture.
107
 Plaintiffs also labor to 
unearth discrimination pre-discovery because of the unequal access they 
have to evidence.
108
 Evidence—such as a defendant’s intent or 
 
 
 102. “We believe that most judges attempt to reach their decisions utilizing facts, evidence, and 
highly constrained legal criteria, while putting aside personal biases, attitudes, emotions, and other 
individuating factors.” Id. at 43 (quoting Nugent, supra note 94, at 4). 
 103. Id. at 43. While noting the prevalence of intuition, the authors also concluded that at times 
judges can and do override its influence with deductive reasoning, resulting in more just outcomes. Id. 
at 3, 9, 13, 18–19, 27–29. But see id. at 37–38 & n.187 (citing studies that conclude deliberation can 
result in inferior outcomes than those from intuition where aesthetic judgment is involved). 
 104. Compare Nugent, supra note 94, at 4 (noting belief that “judges reach their decisions 
utilizing facts, evidence, and highly constrained legal criteria, while putting aside personal biases, 
attitudes, emotions, and other individuating factors.”) with Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 431, 431 (2004) (describing “bad judges” as those who are “incompetent, self-indulgent, abusive, 
or corrupt”). 
 105. Malveaux, supra note 35, at 89. 
 106. See supra Part II.A.1. Malveaux, supra note 35, at 39 (“[P]ervasive institutional changes in 
the contemporary workforce—such as work structure, evaluative models, and relational dynamics—
can facilitate bias in employer decision-making that more easily eludes detection and 
disproportionately works to the detriment of minorities and women.”). 
 107. Id. at 89–90. 
 108. Id. at 91. 
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institutional practices—is often in the defendant’s exclusive possession.109 
Many individuals, not surprisingly, are at a significant disadvantage when 
challenging the misconduct of employers, corporations, and other 
institutions because of this informational asymmetry.
110
 
3. Greater Dismissals of Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights 
Cases 
The Supreme Court’s more taxing interpretation of what Rule 8 
requires of a complaint has made it harder for litigants to gain court access 
and have employment discrimination and civil rights claims resolved on 
the merits.
111
 
a. Empirical Support 
Empirical data uniformly reveals that defendants are more likely to file 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim post-Twombly and Iqbal.
112
 
Studies by the Federal Judicial Center and numerous scholars have 
unearthed a statistically significant increase in the filing rate of 12(b)(6) 
 
 
 109. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. is illustrative. 550 U.S. 618, 641–43 (2007) 
(holding plaintiff’s claim was barred because of the statute of limitations). Unaware of her employer’s 
initial discriminatory decision to pay her less than her male colleagues, plaintiff Lilly Ledbetter 
brought suit against her employer Goodyear well after the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 
621–24. Unsurprisingly, like so many workers, she did not know that she was being systematically 
underpaid. Id. at 649–51 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Congress ultimately responded to this inequity. See 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.) (reversing the Court’s holding). See also Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing 
Civil Procedural Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 626 (2011) (providing 
examples of informational asymmetry in civil rights cases). 
 110. I have explained this dilemma elsewhere: 
Plaintiffs are caught in a Catch-22. They must put facts in their complaint to nudge their 
claim from possible to plausible. Often the only way to get such facts is through discovery. 
But the court will not permit discovery unless the plaintiffs provide the very facts they cannot 
discover. Thus, plaintiffs’ complaints die on the vine not because they lack merit, but because 
plaintiffs do not have the same access to information that the defendant does. By raising the 
pleading bar to plausibility, the Supreme Court has created an untenable situation for 
plaintiffs challenging discrimination where there is informational inequality. 
Malveaux, supra note 109, at 627. See also Roy L. Brooks, Conley and Twombly: A Critical Race 
Theory Perspective, 52 HOW. L.J. 31, 68–69 (2008); Blaze, supra note 81, at 957 (discussing Strauss 
v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 1985), and noting that plaintiff would not normally 
have the requisite factual predicate to show the city had a “custom and practice” of discrimination pre-
discovery, thereby making it “nearly impossible” for his civil rights claim to escape 12(b)(6) 
dismissal). 
 111. The following discussion regarding empirical studies draws from my prior work: Suzette M. 
Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still out for Civil Rights and Employment 
Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 727 (2012–2013). 
 112. Malveaux, supra note 111, at 727. 
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motions to dismiss following the elevated pleading requirement, which 
can be attributed to Twombly and Iqbal.
113
 This is true not only generally, 
but also for employment discrimination cases and civil rights cases in 
particular.
114
 In general, under the new pleading standard, plaintiffs are 
twice as likely to face this dispositive motion: the probability has doubled 
from roughly 3% to 6%.
115
 For employment discrimination cases, the 
probability increased from 7.7% to 10.1%.
116
 For civil rights cases, it 
increased from 11.7% to 12.7%.
117
 Defendants freely admit to strategically 
filing motions to dismiss as a matter of course,
118
 as the statistics bear out. 
The consequence of this trend is that plaintiffs have to spend greater time 
and money to stave off early dismissal.
119
 
 
 
 113. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 
CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 
8 (2011); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial 
Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2012); see THOMAS E. WILLGING, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., USE OF RULE 12(B)(6) IN TWO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, at 12 tbl. 4 (1989) 
(presenting statistics for the pre-Twombly and Iqbal period). Professor Brescia confirmed this post-
Iqbal trend for motions that specifically challenge a complaint’s factual allegations. See Brescia, supra 
note 90, at 262 (“[P]laintiffs faced a considerably higher number of motions to dismiss in which their 
pleadings were challenged as lacking specificity.”). 
 114. The civil rights cases are non-prisoner cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. CECIL ET AL., 
supra note 113, at 8–9 (noting the likelihood of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim being 
filed goes from 10.5% in 2006 to 12.4% in 2010 for civil rights cases). Generally, in civil rights cases, 
the likelihood of a motion to dismiss being filed increased, but did not reach the statistically significant 
0.05 level. Id. at 8. For the subcategory of civil rights cases involving non-prisoner § 1983 cases, 
however, there was a statistically significant increase above the 0.05 level. Id. at 9. 
 115. Id. at 10 tbl.2 (noting the probability of filing went from 2.9% in 2006 to 5.8% in 2010, 
controlling for federal district court and case type); see Hoffman, supra note 113, at 15. 
 116. CECIL ET AL., supra note 113, at 10 tbl.2. 
 117. Id.; see also Brescia, supra note 90, at 280–83 (stating plaintiffs in employment and housing 
discrimination cases are far more likely to face a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on factual specificity 
grounds post-Iqbal than pre-Twombly). 
 118. See, e.g., John C.S. Pierce & D. Kirby Howard, To Twombly or Not to Twombly—That is 
the Question, FOR THE DEFENSE, Sept. 2009, at 89, available at http://forthedefense.org/ 
articles/2009/09_September/FTD-0909-PierceHoward.pdf (suggesting that after the Twombly decision 
defense attorneys “have an opportunity and even an obligation to test the strength of poorly pled 
claims [by filing 12(b)(6) motions]”). Similarly, defense attorney John A. Freedman, a partner at 
Arnold & Porter LLP, explained, “I think I’m more likely to advise a client that given the Supreme 
Court’s guidance on [12(b)(6) motions], yes, you ought to look more seriously at filing a [12(b)(6)] 
motion [but] don’t count on it being granted.” ACS Convention Panel: Access to Federal Courts after 
Iqbal and Twombly, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY 21:34 (July 18, 2010), 
http://www.acslaw.org/news/video/acs-convention-panel-access-to-federal-courts-after-iqbal-and-
twombly [hereinafter ACS Convention Panel]. 
 119. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. 821, 840–41 (2010) (predicting additional costs for plaintiffs as a result of anticipated increase 
in 12(b)(6) motions); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 
12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 633 (2012) (noting additional 12(b)(6) motions result in 
“higher costs for litigants and more work for federal judges”). This is not an option for everyone. See 
Hoffman, supra note 113, at 17. 
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The vast majority of scholars have also found the more rigorous 
pleading standard is resulting in a greater dismissal rate for employment 
discrimination and civil rights cases. Several earlier studies bear this out. 
For example, comparing 12(b)(6) orders shortly before and after Twombly, 
Kendall W. Hannon concluded that under Twombly, a civil rights action 
alleging a constitutional violation
120
 “was 39.6% more likely to be 
dismissed than a random case in the set,”121 and was more likely to be 
dismissed after Twombly than before.
122
 Professor Joseph A. Seiner built 
on Hannon’s work by conducting a similar study that focused on 
Twombly’s impact on cases alleging employment discrimination under 
 
 
 120. Hannon’s civil rights claims are constitutional claims. More specifically, he defines “Civil 
Rights” claims as those “brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983 (and § 1983’s counterpart 
against federal officials—so-called Bivens actions), and 1985, as well as generalized claims of due 
process or equal protection violations.” Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A 
Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1811, 1836 n.161 (2008). Excluded from the “Civil Rights” category were actions brought under 
statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Id. These actions were categorized as 
“Federal Other,” for which there wasn’t sufficient data to conduct a meaningful analysis. Id. at 1836 & 
n.161. 
 121. Id. at 1838. “This result was statistically significant to the 0.05 level.” Id. 
 122. Id. at 1837. A motion to dismiss a civil rights case was likely to be granted 41.7% of the time 
before Twombly, and 52.9% after Twombly. Id. The study did not examine whether there was a 
difference between motions granted with or without prejudice. See generally, id. at 1815 (“[T]he one 
area in which this study does show a significant departure from previous dismissal practice is the civil 
rights field.”). 
 The Hannon study analyzed 3287 federal district court orders that responded to a 12(b)(6) motion. 
Id. at 1835. The study compared cases that cited Conley in the year prior to Twombly with those that 
cited Twombly in the seven months after it was decided. Id. at 1835–36; see Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U.S. 41 (1957). The study examined only those orders published in the Westlaw database. Id. at 1829. 
The study excluded fraud cases governed by Rule 9(b)‘s particularity pleading standard; cases brought 
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000), which are subject 
to a more stringent standard under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 
104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77–78 (2006)); and in forma 
pauperis or pro se cases, which are arguably subjected to a lower pleading standard. Id. at 1831–33. 
Cases were also removed from the database if they did not reflect the “spirit” of the search. Id. at 1834. 
These included cases involving motions for summary judgment, to amend, to reconsider a ruling, or to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 
 The methodology has its advantages and disadvantages. Drawbacks of the methodology include 
its exclusive reliance on the Westlaw electronic database and its timing. Only seven months post-
Twombly, district courts did not have the benefit of appellate guidance on the appropriate 
understanding and application of the new pleading standard, and some were seemingly unaware of the 
standard altogether. Id. at 1830. On the other hand, the timing was advantageous. Because the “vast 
majority” of cases involved complaints drafted pre-Twombly, the change in dismissal rate can more 
readily be attributed to the change in pleading standard rather than a change in attorney drafting. Id. at 
1831. 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
123
 Comparing the dismissal rate 
of employment discrimination cases one year before and after Twombly, 
Professor Seiner discovered about a 2% increase post-Twombly.
124
 In 
another study, Professor Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore found that dismissal 
orders in general increased from 46% to 48% to 56% two years before 
Twombly, two years after Twombly, and immediately following Iqbal, 
 
 
 123. Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1027. The Seiner study analyzed 396 
federal district court orders that responded to a 12(b)(6) motion in a Title VII case. Id. at 1029. The 
study compared 191 cases that cited Conley in the year prior to Twombly with 205 cases that cited 
Twombly in the year after it was decided. Id. The study examined only those orders published in the 
Westlaw database. Id. at 1027–28. In contrast to Hannon, Seiner included cases brought by pro se 
litigants. Id. at 1029 n.134. 
 Because Seiner’s methodology is similar to Hannon’s, their studies share many of the same 
strengths and weaknesses. See id. at 1029, 1031–32. In addition, given that Seiner’s study examines 
only 396 cases, it is admittedly “difficult to draw any concrete conclusions from a purely mathematical 
perspective” and the results are not statistically significant. Id. at 1030 n.140, 1032. 
 124. Id. at 1029–31. More specifically, in the pre-Twombly year, 54.5% of the federal district 
court orders granted the motion to dismiss in whole, while in the post-Twombly year, 57.1% granted 
the motion. Id. at 1029. Additionally, in the pre-Twombly year, 75.4% of the court orders granted the 
motion to dismiss (in whole or in part), while in the post-Twombly year, 77.6% granted the motion. Id. 
at 1030. 
 Professor Seiner duplicated his study for cases alleging employment discrimination under Title I 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or employment-related retaliation under Title V of the 
ADA. Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 116 (2010). The study analyzed 124 
federal district court orders that responded to a 12(b)(6) motion in cases involving either Title I ADA 
employment discrimination claims or Title V ADA employment-related retaliation claims. Id. at 116–
17. The study compared fifty-nine cases that cited Conley in the year prior to Twombly with sixty-five 
that cited Twombly in the year after it was decided. The study examined only those orders published in 
the Westlaw database. Id. The study included cases brought by pro se litigants. Id. at 117. 
 Comparing the dismissal rates one year before and after Twombly, Professor Seiner found a 
similar increase in the dismissal rate of cases under the ADA post-Twombly. Id. at 120. More 
specifically, in the pre-Twombly year, 54.2% of the federal district court orders granted the motions to 
dismiss in whole, while in the post-Twombly year, 64.6% granted such motions. Id. at 120. 
Additionally, in the pre-Twombly year, 64.4% of the court orders granted the motion to dismiss (in 
whole or in part), while in the post-Twombly year, such granting increased to 78.5%. Id. at 120–21. 
Thus, there was a 14.1% increase in the rate at which the ADA cases were partially dismissed post-
Twombly. Id. at 121. 
 Seiner’s ADA study shares the same strengths and weaknesses of his prior Title VII study. See id. 
at 118–21; see also Hoffman, supra note 113, at 16. Because Seiner’s ADA study examines even 
fewer cases than the Title VII study (396 compared to only 124), the ADA study makes it even more 
“difficult to draw any substantial conclusions regarding the resulting differentials between the two data 
sets” from a “purely numerical standpoint.” Seiner, supra note 124, at 118. Again, the results were not 
statistically significant. Id. at 118–19. 
 Although Seiner found an increase in the dismissal rates for both Title VII and ADA cases, he did 
not find an identical judicial reaction to these cases. In the disability context, there has been more 
confusion and inconsistency over the meaning and application of “plausibility.” Id. at 121–26. 
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respectively.
125
 For dismissal orders in civil rights cases,
126
 the increase 
went from 50% to 53% to 58% for the same periods, respectively.
127
 
The empirical studies examining Twombly and Iqbal’s impact on the 
dismissal rate of employment discrimination and civil rights cases, 
however, are not unanimous. The outlier is the Federal Judicial Center’s 
report, published later in 2011.
128
 The FJC’s study, like the other initial 
studies, found that the percentage of motions to dismiss being granted 
post-Twombly and Iqbal had increased.
129
 In particular, the dismissal rates 
 
 
 125. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 
AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010). This result was not statistically significant. Id. at 602 (noting the 
probability of this distribution occurring by chance is 15.2%—”too high for conventional statistical 
significance”). 
 The Hatamyar study randomly selected 500 federal district court opinions ruling on a 12(b)(6) 
motion in the two years before Twombly, 500 in the two years after Twombly, and 200 in the four 
months following Iqbal for a total of 1200 cases. Id. at 555–56. The study examined only those orders 
published in the Westlaw database. Id. at 584. The study excluded prisoner litigation brought under the 
PLRA and seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. Id. at 585. The study also excluded dismissals on 
grounds other than 12(b)(6), such as lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, improper venue, 
failure to join an indispensable party, and summary judgment. Id. at 586. Cases involving a more 
rigorous pleading standard—such as those alleging fraud or a PSLRA violation—were also excluded. 
Id. at 587. The study included 12(c) motions for judgments on the pleadings and 12(b)(6) motions 
from any opposing party, such as counterclaims. Id. at 588. The study also included pro se cases. Id. at 
589. After applying these exclusions and inclusions, Professor Hatamyar Moore examined a total of 
1039 cases in the database: 444 applying Conley, 422 applying Twombly, and 173 applying Iqbal. Id. 
at 585. Like the Hannon and Seiner studies, Hatamyar’s study advises the reader to exercise caution 
when interpreting the data because of the small data pool and the relatively short time period involving 
Iqbal decisions. Id. at 556. 
 126. Professor Hatamyar Moore categorized type of cases by those listed on the federal district 
court docket sheet. Because the vast majority of cases identified as “prisoner petitions” alleged civil 
rights violations, she included “prisoner petitions” in the “Civil Rights” category. The “Civil Rights” 
category is comprised of:  
 [1] Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged federal constitutional violations, whether or not 
they purported to bring the case under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (equal rights under the law), 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for deprivation of rights), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (conspiracy to 
interfere with civil rights), or Bivens actions. 
 [2] Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged unlawful employment discrimination on the 
basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 [3] Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), or the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
  [4] Any other civil rights actions, including sex discrimination under Title IX. 
Id. at 591–92 (footnotes omitted). 
 127. Id. at 607. Disaggregating this further for dismissal orders in constitutional civil rights cases, 
the increase went from 50% to 55% to 60%, and for dismissal orders in Title VII cases, the rate went 
from 42% to 54% to 53%. Id. at 608–09. 
 128. The FJC published a report in March of 2011 and an update the following November, 
comparing motion practice in 2006 and 2010. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 113. 
 129. See supra Part II.A.3.a. 
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increased from 66% to 75% for all civil cases,
130
 from 70% to 78% for 
civil rights cases, and from 67% to 71% for employment discrimination 
cases.
131
 
However, where the FJC differed was its interpretation of the results. 
The FJC advised caution in interpreting the results primarily on two 
grounds. First, the FJC found that, in general, there was an increase in 
motions granted with leave to amend, but a decrease in motions granted 
without leave to amend, conceivably providing plaintiffs with more 
opportunities to fix their complaints.
132
 Second, the FJC did not attribute 
the increased dismissal rate in civil cases to Twombly and Iqbal. After 
controlling for additional variables that might explain the higher dismissal 
rate,
133
 the FJC found no “statistically significant increase in the rate at 
which motions to dismiss were granted” (with or without an opportunity to 
amend) for all cases, with the exception of those challenging financial 
instruments.
134
 Moreover, the FJC found no statistically significant 
increase in the dismissal rate for civil rights and employment 
discrimination cases.
135
 
But, more recent quantitative studies following the FJC’s report have 
largely confirmed initial findings of disparate impact on workplace 
discrimination and civil rights cases. In a study designed to replicate the 
FJC’s work,136 Professor Hatamyar Moore found a substantially greater 
 
 
 130. CECIL ET AL., supra note 113 at 14 tbl.4. This increase is statistically significant at the p ≤ 
0.01 level. Id. 
 131. Id. This increase for employment discrimination cases is not statistically significant at the p ≤ 
0.05 level. Id.; see also Hoffman, supra note 113, at 7 (“As for dismissal orders, the FJC found that in 
every case category that was examined there were more orders granting dismissal after Iqbal than there 
were before Twombly, both with and without prejudice. Most importantly, in every case category 
examined it was more likely that a motion to dismiss would be granted.”). 
 132. CECIL ET AL., supra note 113, at 13. The only instance where this was not true was for cases 
challenging financial instruments. Id. at 14, 21. See also Brescia, supra note 90, at 270 (failing to find 
a significant rise in dismissal rates with prejudice post-Twombly or Iqbal). The FJC found this 
distinction sufficiently meaningful to break down its analysis and present its findings on the basis of 
whether a motion to dismiss was granted with or without prejudice. CECIL ET AL., supra note 113, at 
13. 
 133. The FJC controlled for differences in caseloads among district courts, types of cases, and the 
existence of an amended complaint. CECIL ET AL., supra note 113, at 13. 
 134. Id. at 21. These cases are comprised primarily of individuals challenging lenders or loan 
servicing companies over residential mortgages or refinances and are largely associated with the 
financial housing crisis. Id. at 12. These cases were the only type more likely to be dismissed with 
prejudice. Id. at 21. The FJC did not attribute this greater dismissal rate to plaintiffs’ failure to 
sufficiently plead facts under Twombly and Iqbal. Id. 
 135. Id. at 32 (“[W]e found no statistically significant increase [at the 0.01 or 0.05 level] in the 
likelihood that motions were granted for . . . [non-financial instrument] cases.”). 
 136. Professor Hatamyar Moore’s updated study is based on the same design as her original one, 
except she increased the number of randomly selected federal district court opinions ruling on a 
12(b)(6) motion from 200 to 500 in the year following Iqbal. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 119, at 
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dismissal rate post-Iqbal than the FJC did.
137
 Her updated study—which 
included a bigger sample of post-Iqbal cases—indicated that, in general, 
12(b)(6) motions were more likely to be granted in full (with and without 
leave to amend) post-Iqbal.
138
 Courts granted such motions at an even 
higher rate for constitutional civil rights cases.
139
 Professor Raymond 
Brescia’s more recent study of employment and housing discrimination 
cases found little impact on the dismissal rates post-Twombly, but 
considerable increase post-Iqbal for such cases.
140
 Newer studies indicate 
that not only are civil rights complaints more vulnerable to dismissal at a 
statistically significant level post-Iqbal, but that this is true regardless of 
whether a judges grants or denies leave to amend. Evidence shows that 
while the increase in dismissals is largely due to grants with leave to 
amend,
141
 grants without leave to amend are increasing. Civil rights 
 
 
609–10. Like her prior study, she examined only those orders published in the Westlaw database. Id. at 
612. The study excluded dismissals on grounds other than 12(b)(6). Id. at 610–11. Cases involving a 
more rigorous pleading standard—such as those alleging fraud or a PSLRA violation—were also 
excluded. Id. The study included only pro se cases subject to the 12(b)(6) dismissal standard or the 
Rule 8(a)(2) default pleading standard. Id. at 611. After applying these exclusions and inclusions, 
Hatamyar Moore examined a total of 1326 cases in the database: 444 under Conley, 422 under 
Twombly, and 460 under Iqbal. Id. at 611. 
 In an attempt to replicate the results of the FJC’s study, Professor Hatamyar Moore’s updated 
study removed pro se plaintiffs’ cases in certain tables for comparison and limited the time frame to 
cases decided in 2006 and 2010. Id. at 608, 618. However, her updated study differed because it drew 
cases from eighty-six rather than twenty-three federal district courts; relied on the entire 2006 calendar 
year, but only the first six months of 2010; and included only Westlaw-published cases. See id. at 643–
44. 
 137. Id. at 608–09. 
 138. Id. at 614. This study found that 61% of motions were granted under Iqbal, in comparison to 
46% under Conley. Id. at 609. Moreover, cases are more likely to be terminated under Iqbal than 
Conley. Id. at 624–26, 648–50. 
 139. Id. at 618–19. The study found that 64% of motions were granted under Iqbal for 
constitutional civil rights cases, in comparison to 41% under Conley. Id. at 619. Moreover, for 
“constitutional civil rights cases, courts were 3.77 times more likely to” grant in full a motion to 
dismiss with prejudice under Iqbal than under Conley. Id. at 623 & tbl.4. And for a motion to dismiss 
without prejudice for civil rights cases, the “courts were fourteen times more likely to grant” the 
motion in full, rather than deny, under Iqbal. Id. at 623. Even when pro se plaintiffs were excluded, 
constitutional civil rights cases were dismissed at a higher rate. Id. at 618–19. 
 140. Brescia, supra note 90, at 239–40. Professor Brescia’s study is unique in its focus on a subset 
of civil rights cases and on dismissals based on the sufficiency of the factual allegations pled. Id. at 
260. Professor Brescia examined the impact of the new federal pleading standard on motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and motions for judgment on the pleadings 
under Rule 12(c) in employment and housing discrimination cases. Id. at 239. The study included 
claims brought under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, the ADEA, the Family Medical 
Leave Act, the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and retaliation provisions. Id. at 266. 
He limited his study to federal district court orders in the Lexis database that assessed the factual 
specificity of the pleadings forty-one months before Twombly, twenty-four months between Twombly 
and Iqbal, and nineteen months after Iqbal. Id. at 262–63. His study does not control for certain factors 
the FJC did, such as circuit and district courts, or amended complaints. 
 141. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 119, at 606–68, 621. 
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plaintiffs are running a greater risk of having their complaints dismissed 
with prejudice and in their entirety.
142
 These findings temper optimism that 
plaintiffs can at least amend their complaints post-dismissal. Admittedly, 
empiricists still disagree
143—but overall, the vast majority concludes that 
the viability of employment discrimination and civil rights cases under the 
new federal pleading standard has been significantly compromised. 
There are a number of reasons why the FJC Study and the 
overwhelming bulk of empirical work diverge—a full examination of 
which is beyond the scope of this Article and addressed elsewhere.
144
 But, 
in a nutshell, empiricists primarily disagree over the role and degree of 
statistical significance,
145
 the selection of controlled independent 
variables,
146
 the significance of an opportunity to amend,
147
 and the 
appropriate data pool.
148
 Not surprisingly, where there are statistics, there 
is bound to be a battle of the experts.
149
 
This battle is tempered by noteworthy consensus among those doing 
this complex and worthy empirical work.
150
 Empiricists agree that there 
are more 12(b)(6) motions being filed
151
 and granted post-Iqbal.
152
 This 
 
 
 142. For example, in his examination of employment and housing discrimination cases, Professor 
Brescia found that courts were not only more likely to dismiss such cases post-Iqbal, but also to 
dismiss them with prejudice. Brescia, supra note 90, at 260–61, 268–70. 
 Professor Hatamyar Moore’s updated study indicates that the risk that a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss will be granted with prejudice, compared to denied, was 1.75 times greater under Iqbal than 
Conley. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 119, at 605. Unlike her prior study, she found that this risk was 
statistically significant. Id. at 605, 621. Again, unlike her prior study, the probability of a plaintiff’s 
case being entirely dismissed with prejudice was 1.71 times greater under Iqbal than Conley, which is 
considered to be a statistically significant rate. Id. at 605. The risk for constitutional civil rights cases 
was 3.77 times greater. Id. at 623 & tbl.4. 
 143. The author of the FJC’s report is critical of Professor Hatamyar Moore’s study for excluding 
certain variables, relying on the Westlaw database, and using flawed search terms for capturing post-
Iqbal decisions. Joe S. Cecil, Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC Study: 
Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal 25–34 (Fedearl Judicial Center, Draft Mar. 
19, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026103. Similarly, 
Professor Brescia’s study is criticized for relying on the Lexis database, not controlling for certain 
variables, and using pre-Twombly cases that are atypical of pleadings practice at the time. Id. at 36–37. 
A follow-up study of a subset of employment and housing discrimination cases by the FJC found an 
increase in the dismissal rate that did not meet the conventional standards of statistical significance. Id. 
at 35–36. 
 144. See generally Malveaux, supra note 111.  
 145. See id. at 733–35. 
 146. See id. at 736. 
 147. See id. at 737. 
 148. See id. at 738–39. 
 149. “‘There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.’” MARK TWAIN, MARK 
TWAIN’S OWN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE CHAPTERS FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 185 (Michael 
J. Kiskis ed., 2d ed. 2010) (quoting Disraeli). 
 150. Malveaux, supra note 111, at 739. 
 151. See discussion supra at Part II.A.3.a. 
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means that even if the dismissal rate remained the same, the net outcome 
is that more cases are being dismissed post-Iqbal, including those alleging 
workplace discrimination and civil rights violations.
153
 Empiricists also 
agree that there are inherent limitations of empirical work, in general,
154
 
and shortcomings of certain design choices, in particular.
155
 For example, 
quantitative studies do not reveal changes in pleadings practice, deterrence 
from filing potentially viable cases, or dismissals of possibly meritorious 
cases.”156 
Although helpful, statistics cannot tell the whole story. Much can be 
learned about the disparate impact of procedural law on substantive law 
from the attorneys and judges themselves, through anecdotal evidence and 
case law.  
 
 
 152. Malveaux, supra note 111, at 739; see Brescia, supra note 90, at 241 (“[T]wo things are 
clear: motions to dismiss challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings are much more common since 
Iqbal, and far more cases are being dismissed after the release of that decision than before. At least in 
this regard, then, the initial fears about the impact of Twombly and Iqbal seem well founded, regardless 
of whether the dismissal rates have changed dramatically . . . .”); id. at 262 (“[A]part from the mere 
dismissal rate, the number of cases in which complaints were dismissed, either in whole or in part, rose 
dramatically after Iqbal.”). 
 153. As the FJC reports: 
Even if the rate at which motions are granted remains unchanged over time, the total number 
of cases with motions granted may still increase. The 7% increase in case filings combined 
with the increase in the rate at which motions are filed in 2010 may result in more cases in 
recent years with motions granted, even though the rate at which motions are granted has 
remained the same. 
CECIL ET AL., supra note 113, at 22; see also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON 
RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1, 5 (2011) (finding an increased 
filing rate of 12(b)(6) motions combined with stable grant rate results in overall increase in percentage 
of cases dismissed); Cecil, supra note 143, at 11 (stating that prior study “explicitly acknowledges that 
increases in filing rates of motions to dismiss due to Twombly and Iqbal may result in an increase in 
the number of motions granted even if the grant rate remains unchanged”).  
 154. Malveaux, supra note 111, at 739–40. 
 155. Id. at 739–40 & nn.108–11(discussing design limitations of FJC’s initial report); id. at 733–
39 (discussing criticisms of FJC’s methodology and interpretation); id. at 743 (discussing FJC’s 
criticisms of more recent empirical studies). The FJC and scholars studying the impact of the new 
pleadings regime have learned from each other and wisely adapted their approaches in response to 
mutual critiques. See id. at 740 (“Critics have been the catalyst for a variety of subsequent changes, 
ranging from the FJC’s disclosing results at different p-values, to including pro se cases and those 
containing counterclaims and cross-claims.”); see, e.g., Cecil, supra note 143, at 1 n.3 (FJC 
modifications made in response to feedback); Malveaux, supra note 111, at 741 & n.115 (describing 
Professor Hatamyar Moore’s updated study attempting to replicate FJC study and build from it). 
 156. See Malveaux, supra note 111, at 739–40. 
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b. Practitioner Experience and Judicial Approach 
Practitioners reveal that they have changed their pleadings practices 
when possible to accommodate the more rigorous pleading standard.
157
 
For example, a survey of lawyers with the National Employment Lawyers 
Association (NELA), report making more factual allegations in their 
complaints.
158
 Seventy percent of those who filed employment 
discrimination cases report that they changed the way they structured their 
complaints post-Twombly.
159
 Of those lawyers, 94% of them included 
more factual allegations.
160
 More drastically, some lawyers have been 
chilled or discouraged from pursuing potentially meritorious cases 
altogether.
161
 
Following Twombly and Iqbal, federal district courts dismiss civil 
rights cases that they would not have otherwise,
162
 and federal courts of 
appeals affirm most 12(b)(6) dismissals.
163
 But even in this landscape, 
 
 
 157. This experience is not unanimous. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL 
CIVIL LITIGATION 25 (2010) (telephone interviews with thirty-five attorneys revealed that most did not 
see an impact of Twombly and Iqbal on their practice, other than an increase in costs due to additional 
12(b)(6) litigation). 
 158.  EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY SATISFACTION 
WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 12 (2010). 
 159. Id. at 11–12. 
 160. Id. at 12. 
 161. See JOSHUA CIVIN & DEBO P. ADEGBILE, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, 
RESTORING ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF IQBAL AND TWOMBLY ON FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS 
LITIGATION (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/defaultfiles/Civin_Adegbile_Iqbal_ 
Twombly.pdf. For example, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, legal scholar and partner at Lieff Cabraser Heimann 
& Bernstein, LLP, explains Twombly and Iqbal’s impact on her plaintiff-based practice: 
We spend a lot more time [crafting pleadings] . . . and I will say that we do reject some cases 
that we believe do have merit because the truth is implausible on its face. You know, history 
is just one implausible thing after another, and sometimes what happens to people is 
implausible, too . . . . So, it has had an impact, probably more on my clients and potential 
clients than on our law firm. 
ACS Convention Panel, supra note 118, at 12:24. The FJC’s empirical data, however, does not support 
this conclusion. See Cecil, supra note 143, at 18 (“These findings do not prove that cases are not being 
deterred from filing in federal court . . . . Nevertheless, these findings offer no support to those who 
believe that such deterrence is taking place, and no better evidence appears to be available.”). 
 162. See Malveaux, supra note 109, at 627 & n.33 (citing examples); Malveaux, supra note 35, at 
86 & n.137 (citing examples); CIVIN & ADEGBILE, supra note 161, at 9–10. 
 163. See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 119, at 626–27. Professor Hatamyar Moore relies on cases 
collected by the Rules Law Clerk to the Honorable Lee A. Rosenthal, to the Civil Rules Committee 
and Standing Rules Committee, up to July 26, 2010. Id. at 627 n.62. Of the roughly one hundred 
appellate court cases collected by the Rules Law Clerk up to July 26, 2010, 73% of them affirmed 
district court grants of 12(b)(6) motions. Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to 
Hon. Lee A. Rosenthal, to Civil Rules Comm. & Standing Rules Comm. (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter 
Kuperman Memo], available at http:// www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_ 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
484 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:455 
 
 
 
 
judicial reaction has not been uniform.
164
 Some courts are taking a 
flexible, contextualized approach
165
 by allowing pleading upon 
information and belief
166
 when appropriate, liberally granting leave to 
amend,
167
 and permitting the parties to take limited, targeted discovery 
prior to 12(b)(6) rulings
168—an approach I have recommended 
elsewhere.
169
 
In sum, there are numerous data points and sources unearthing the 
trouble that claimants who challenge workplace and other discrimination 
have in participating in the civil litigation system. Initial entry has been 
blockaded by a judicial interpretation of the Rules that promotes 
exclusivity and inequities. 
B. Class Actions 
Plaintiffs challenging discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere 
also find it more difficult to act collectively by aggregating their claims in 
a class action. This is because the Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 23’s 
class certification requirements in such a way that putative class actions 
have a higher bar to clear to get certified.
170
 Although applicable to all 
 
 
memo_072610.pdf. Of the forty-six civil rights dismissals under 12(b)(6), 74% of them were affirmed. 
Id. Professor Hatamyar Moore’s study does not include cases collected by the Rules Law Clerk 
beyond July 26, 2010. See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 119, at 627 n.62. See Memorandum from 
Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Hon. Lee A. Rosenthal, to Civil Rules Comm. & Standing 
Comm. (Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Kuperman Memo II], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/iqbalmemo_112311.pdf. 
 164. Malveaux, supra note 111, at 744. 
 165. CECIL ET AL., supra note 113, at 2–3; Kuperman Memo II, supra note 163, at 4, 5. 
 166. Kuperman Memo II, supra note 163, at 5. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). 
 167. CECIL ET AL., supra note 113, at 13 (“In 2010, 35% of the orders [granting motions to 
dismiss] granted [the] motions [] with leave to amend at least some of the claims in the complaint, 
compared with 21% of the orders in 2006.”); id. at 21; Kuperman Memo II, supra note 163, at 5–6. 
 168. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“If 
the plaintiff shows that he can’t conduct an even minimally adequate investigation without limited 
discovery, the judge presumably can allow that discovery, meanwhile deferring ruling on the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.”); Malveaux, supra note 35, at 131 n.388, 137–38; see, e.g., Rodriguez 
v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2009) (allowing pro se prisoner limited 
discovery to ascertain names of defendants); Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051–52 
(9th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal of the amended complaint after the court 
permitted discovery to allow plaintiffs to gather facts to meet antitrust pleading requirements); In re 
Netflix Antitrust Litig., 506 F. Supp. 2d 308, 321 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (allowing for limited discovery 
under Twombly). 
 169. See Malveaux, supra note 35, at 132–41 (describing proposal). This approach addresses the 
informational asymmetry problem and levels the playing field for civil rights claimants deprived of 
court access because the defendant has exclusive possession of important evidence pre-discovery. 
 170. See Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing into a 
Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1015, 1036–41 (2012) (discussing Dukes’s elimination of 
“the ‘predominance’ standard as a means of determining” certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and noting 
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cases, heightened certification is a major issue for claims alleging systemic 
discrimination. 
Appropriately, a class action is a procedural anomaly—running counter 
to the fundamental principle that “litigation is conducted by and on behalf 
of the individual named parties only.”171 Mandatory class actions172—
where individual plaintiffs
173
 are not entitled to notice, are barred from 
excluding themselves, and are bound by the results—require robust 
scrutiny to ensure Due Process is achieved.
174
 This extraordinary situation 
is justified only by a commensurate class homogeneity and cohesiveness, 
safeguarded by the text of Rule 23 itself.
175
 In Title VII cases brought 
under Rule 23(b)(2), for example, this mandatory class action is justified 
because all class members share the same goal of eradicating systemic 
misconduct brought about by a company policy or general practice.
176
 The 
party opposing class certification is also entitled to Due Process and must 
be afforded an opportunity to defend itself. Individual cases cannot be 
inappropriately lumped together in a single suit, thereby foreclosing 
 
 
that “employment discrimination back-pay claims that before were easily certified under Rule 23(b)(2) 
now will have additional scrutiny”). 
 171. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–701 (1979). 
 172. Mandatory class actions are those certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2). They do not require 
that class members be given notice or an opportunity to opt out of the litigation, as Rule 23(b)(3) does. 
Rule 23(b)(1) permits a class action when there is a risk that, in the absence of a class action (a) the 
party opposing the class will be subject to inconsistent obligations, or (b) as a practical matter, 
piecemeal litigation of individual class members will impair the interests of other class members who 
are not parties to the individual lawsuits, as is the case in a trust fund. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). Rule 
23(b)(2) permits a class action when there is class-wide conduct that makes “final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief” appropriate for the whole class, as is the case for many civil rights 
claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 Alternatively, a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(3)—the “catch-all” provision—requires 
that class members be provided notice and the right to opt-out because the connection between class 
members is not nearly as strong. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Plaintiffs with particularly strong claims 
may do better bringing their cases individually, and as such, enjoy a process that is faster and more 
interactive. A Rule 23(b)(3) class—the most common type—is permitted when common questions 
predominate over individual ones and a class action is superior to other methods of resolving a dispute. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  
 173. Although defendants may seek class certification and form a defendant class, this is rare. 
David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 919 
(1998) (“[T]oday defendant class actions are rare and pose special problems of representation and due 
process . . . .”). Thus, this Article uses the term “defendant” when describing a party opposing class 
certification and “plaintiff” when describing a party seeking class certification. Defendant class actions 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 174. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbids deprivation of 
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. 
 175. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 176. Rule 23(b)(2) allows a class action where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused 
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
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companies’ abilities to defend themselves from individual claims.177 Not 
surprisingly and appropriately, this procedural exception is only made 
following a “rigorous”178 analysis and under very limited circumstances. 
Such aggregate ligation—while relatively rare—has been largely criticized 
by those in the business community
179
 who argue that the tremendous 
financial exposure caused by class actions makes class certification akin to 
blackmail and the pressure to settle irresistible.
180
 Critics also argue that 
class actions are motivated primarily by self-interested plaintiffs’ lawyers 
who use group litigation to enrich themselves to the public’s detriment.181 
Indeed, public perception of widespread class action abuse led to passage 
of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).182 CAFA provides 
additional checks and balances for coupon and other class settlements, and 
liberalized federal jurisdiction for class actions, in response to complaints 
that some state courts (“judicial hellholes”) did not exercise sufficient 
rigor when deciding class certification.
183
 This has led to an increase in 
 
 
 177. This argument was successful in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which held that Title VII 
required an employer to be able to assert affirmative defenses for each individual plaintiff. 131 S. Ct. 
2541, 2561 (2011). 
 178. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982). 
 179. Corporations and those supporting large, commercial interests—such as the United States 
Chambers of Commerce—have largely been in opposition to robust class certification. See, e.g., U.S. 
Chamber Commends Supreme Court for Limiting Class Action Abuses, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
(Mar. 18, 2013, 8:00 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-commends-supreme 
-court-limiting-class-action-abuses (supporting measures that limit class actions, including “greater 
scrutiny of class certification”). 
 180. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing HENRY 
J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)) (referring to settlements induced 
by the possibility of a large judgment in a class action as “blackmail settlements”); see also Waste 
Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding “an appeal ordinarily 
should be permitted when the grant of class status raises the stakes of the litigation so substantially that 
the defendant likely will feel irresistible pressure to settle”); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 
557 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing “in terrorem” settlements). 
 181. Daniel Fisher, Plaintiff? Is that Really Necessary in a Class Action? FORBES (February 4, 
2014, 10:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/02/04/plaintiff-is-that-really-necessary-
in-a-class-action/ (“[C]lass actions are often more about enriching lawyers than their clients . . . .”); see 
generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 76 (2011) (“[T]he 
bigness of class action damages tempt some lawyers. Some will file a suit for the settlement value 
rather than to obtain meaningful relief for every class member.”). 
 182. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  
 183. CAFA § 1712(e) (restricting the circumstances under which a court may approve “a proposed 
settlement under which class members would be awarded coupons”); H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 163 
(2003) (Zoe Lofgren, Dissenting Views) (referring to the 2002 Judicial Hellholes Report by the 
American Tort Reform Association). See generally EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1–
2, 6–8 (2008), 
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class actions in federal court on diversity of citizenship jurisdictional 
grounds.
184
 This shift from state to federal court under CAFA errs on the 
side of certification denials and dismissals.
185
 
Although there are certainly dramatic examples of class action abuse, 
this concern is largely overblown and unsupported empirically.
186
 Thus, 
although the certification inquiry is “rigorous,” this rigor must be 
tempered by recognition that aggregation serves at least three important 
objectives: access, enforcement, and efficiency. First, for many employees 
and others, a class action is their only meaningful access to the court 
system. Those with small claims and limited resources are often 
disinclined, or unable, to challenge powerful corporations on their own.
187
 
Individually, the litigation costs and attorney’s fees may exceed the value 
of the recovery,
188
 resulting in employees foregoing legal action 
altogether. In the absence of aggregate litigation, an employee may be too 
fearful of losing her job or of other retaliation to challenge her employer—
especially a worldwide, mega-corporation.
189
 In this regard, the class 
action helps level the playing field between those with differential power 
and resources.
190
 
 
 
 184. LEE, supra note 183, at 7–8; see also Kenneth Jost, Class Action Lawsuits, 21 CQ 
RESEARCHER 433, 448 (2010), Miller, supra note 8, at 320 (ascribing “the federalization of virtually 
all substantial class and mass actions” to CAFA). 
 185. Miller, supra note 8, at 320 n.129, 321.  
 186. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why 
“Exit” Works Better than “Voice,” 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 410 (2008) (rejecting defense bar’s 
argument that class actions “are frivolous and extortionate, brought by legal shake-down artists 
seeking a quick payoff” because such argument is “self-interested . . . shallow—and also very out of 
date”); see also Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class 
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1403 & n.51 (2000) (class actions 
pressure defendants to settle but “critics may well overstate the danger of blackmail against 
defendants”); Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of 
Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 177–78 (1996) (describing 
results of the Federal Judicial Center’s 1994–95 study on Rule 23 and noting that many potentially 
abusive claims “were filed as class actions and never certified as such” and “were terminated by 
rulings on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment”). 
 187. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“The 
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only 
a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”). 
 188. This is known as a “negative value suit.” See JAY TIDMARSH, 1 CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE 
PRINCIPLES TO PROMOTE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY § 1.03 at 2 (2013) (defining “negative value 
case” as one “in which the value of the individual recovery is smaller than the costs of bringing a 
case”).  
 189. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 76. 
 190. The class action was developed “as a procedural device to protect individuals from 
exploitation by large entities.” Id. at 74. The class action offsets the benefits that large companies 
receive from their economies of scale, their market and legal power, and their repeat-player advantage. 
See id. at 75–76. See also Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving 
the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 222–26 (1990) (describing the 
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Second, aggregate litigation promotes law enforcement in several 
ways. Opting out of class litigation can functionally immunize companies 
from complying with the law, and eliminates a major instrument of 
deterrence. Even if employees are able to seek redress for individual 
harms, in the absence of collective action, they often cannot challenge 
widespread misconduct as successfully. On an individual basis, employers 
can more easily mask discrimination. A class-wide challenge enables 
plaintiffs to more easily obtain evidence
191
 that can unearth trends and 
systemic wrongdoing. In turn, this enables plaintiffs to craft remedies and 
injunctive relief far greater in scope than what could be done in an 
individual capacity. The class action net also puts others on notice of 
discriminatory practices and subsequent remedies of which they may not 
have been aware.
192
 Moreover, if plaintiffs are able to prove a pattern or 
practice of workplace discrimination in a Title VII class action, they 
benefit from burden-shifting in their favor. After a discriminatory pattern 
or practice finding, “[e]ach class member enjoys a rebuttable presumption 
that she was the victim of the discrimination, subject to the employer’s 
ability to prove otherwise.”193 Moreover, class actions led by private 
attorneys fill the gap left by government agencies that are often burdened 
by budgetary and political constraints.
194
 As recognized by the Supreme 
Court and Congress, class actions are part of the Title VII enforcement 
scheme.
195
 
Third, enabling plaintiffs—especially those with small value claims 
and limited resources—to jointly challenge widespread conduct in a single 
stroke fosters efficiency. Together, employees can share the risks and 
burdens of litigation and pool their resources, making it economically 
feasible to challenge misconduct through the court system.
196
 Aggregate 
 
 
historical development of group litigation from 1700 to the present); see generally STEPHEN C. 
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (explaining 
the history of the class action). 
 191. For example, class representatives can justify getting access to statements from management, 
corporate documents, and companywide statistics. 
 192. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 76 (employees unlikely to sue because they are 
unaware of illegality). 
 193. Malveaux, supra note 109, at 631. 
 194. Id.; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 75. 
 195. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (“Congress provided, in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, for class actions for enforcement of provisions of the Act . . . .”). 
 196. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 76 (describing how absent aggregation, lawyers 
have no financial incentive to take low-value employment cases, while corporate employers have 
incentive to cheat employees). 
 Title VII employment discrimination cases may also be negative-value suits, despite the fact that 
their claims are not de minimus. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Fighting to Keep Employment 
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litigation saves judges and parties substantial time and money by resolving 
similar claims in one case. Not insignificantly, employers enjoy the 
efficacy and closure a class settlement can offer. In sum, class certification 
should be demanding, but not so much so that it compromises the 
numerous benefits aggregation has to offer. 
Not only does the class action device play a critical role in the 
American civil justice system generally, it plays a special role in the civil 
rights context. Historically, class actions have been central to the civil 
rights movement—as the procedural vehicle for structural reform in cases 
from school desegregation to prisoners’ rights to employment 
discrimination. For example, one of the most preeminent Supreme Court 
cases of the twentieth century—Brown v. Board of Education197—was a 
class action.
198
 
The modern class action rule, Rule 23, is critical to curtailing 
workplace discrimination and civil rights violations. Far from simply an 
intricate joinder device, this aggregation method was designed to empower 
everyday people to promote and enforce public policy.
199
 As indicated by 
the drafters,
200
 the Rule was revised extensively in 1966, “so that it would 
provide a useful procedural vehicle, particularly for civil rights cases.”201 
Through class actions and statutory delegation of private attorney general 
status to ordinary citizens, private individuals and their counsel 
supplemented, subsidized, and even substituted official government 
regulation.
202
 Against this backdrop, federal courts applied a liberal 
approach to class certification, especially in the civil rights context.
203
 
 
 
Discrimination Class Actions Alive: How Allison v. Citgo’s Predomination Requirement Threatens to 
Undermine Title VII Enforcement, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 405, 429 (2005) (“Even if 
plaintiffs may have a greater incentive to pursue their individual claims because of Title VII’s 
$300,000 damage cap, plaintiffs are not able to spread the costs of litigation as class members would 
be able to in the class action context.”). 
 197. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding unanimously that “separate but equal” doctrine was 
unconstitutional). 
 198. The case was, in fact, a consolidation of four separate class actions originating in Delaware, 
Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id. at 486. There was also a companion case that originated in 
the District of Columbia. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 199. Miller, supra note 8, at 314; see also David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, 
Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 594 (2013). 
 200. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note. 
 201. Miller, supra note 8, at 315; see also Arthur R. Miller, Some Very Personal Reflections on 
the Rules, Rulemaking, and Reporters, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 652–53 (2013). 
 202. Miller, supra note 8, at 316. 
 203. See ROBERT H. KLONOFF, EDWARD K.M. BILICH & SUZETTE M. MALVEAUX, CLASS 
ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 788 (West, 3d ed. 2012). 
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However, class action law has become increasingly obstructionist.
204
 
As Professor Arthur R. Miller correctly notes: “The class certification 
motion . . . has become yet another procedural stop sign undermining the 
utility of one of today’s most basic and important joinder mechanisms 
. . . .”205 Claimants seeking to challenge discriminatory practices in the 
workplace and elsewhere
206
 have been hit particularly hard by increasingly 
restrictive applications and interpretations of Rule 23, discussed below. 
1. Heightened Commonality
207
 
In one of the largest private-employer civil rights class actions in 
American history, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
208
 the Supreme Court 
heightened Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. As I have discussed 
elsewhere,
209
 this five to four ruling by the conservative majority raised 
the bar for one of the easiest class action thresholds, thereby jeopardizing 
Title VII and related claims going forward.
210
 
 
 
 204. This was in large measure due to the expansion of civil rights in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 205. Miller, supra note 8, at 321. 
 206. This does not mean that other substantive legal areas at times have not suffered 
disproportionately under class action jurisprudence. Mass torts, for example, were the object of 
significant judicial resistance in the 1980s. Id., supra note 8, at 316–17; see also RICHARD A. 
NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 71–94 (2007) (describing the development of 
settlement in mass tort class actions); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort 
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1356, 1384–1421 (1995) (analyzing several contexts of mass 
torts, including asbestos, silcone gel breast implants, mass disasters, and mass tort property damage, 
and describing judicial attitudes towards such claims); see, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815, 821 (1999) (holding that “applicants for contested certification . . . must show that the fund is 
limited by more than the agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging 
within the class by a process addressing any conflicting interests of class members”); Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597, 620–22 (1997) (strictly applying class certification criteria to 
proposed class settlement of asbestos claims because of “overriding importance” of enforcing the 
Rules as written); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifiying 
national class of smokers because the district court “failed to consider how variations in state law 
affect predominance and superiority” and did not consider “how a trial on the merits would be 
conducted”); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1074, 1081–83, 1085–86 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(decertifying class in product liability case alleging defective penile implants because plaintiffs failed 
to prove sufficient commonality of factual and legal claims); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 
1293, 1297, 1299–1300, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995) (decertifying class of hemophiliacs in case seeking 
damages for blood contamination). 
 207. This term comes from Professor A. Benjamin Spencer. Spencer, supra note 5, at 445 n.23 
(defining “heightened commonality”). 
 208. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 209. See generally Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 37–45 (2011), available at http://www.law. 
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/18/LRColl2011n18Malveaux.pdf. 
 210. As Professor Catherine Fisk and Dean Erwin Chemerinsky recognize: 
[I]n Wal-Mart . . . the Supreme Court abandoned any pretense of equilibration and handed 
large companies huge victories. The significance, of course, is not simply that Wal-Mart’s 
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Dukes involved former and current female employees who brought a 
class action against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., on behalf of approximately 1.5 
million women, alleging nationwide gender discrimination, in violation of 
Title VII.
211
 Plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart gave its local managers 
unfettered discretion when making pay and promotions decisions, 
resulting in women being disproportionately underpaid and denied 
advancement.
212
 To demonstrate that class members had enough in 
common with each other to justify collective action—as required by Rule 
23(a)(2)
213—plaintiffs proffered statistics showing gender disparities in 
pay and promotions; 120 employee affidavits reporting discrimination; 
and testimony from a sociologist, concluding that Wal-Mart’s corporate 
culture and personnel practices made it susceptible to gender 
discrimination.
214
 
Conceding that even a single common question would suffice under 
Rule 23(a)(2), the Court concluded that the women failed to make even 
this minimal showing.
215
 Relying on dicta in a footnote of General 
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,
216
 the Court required plaintiffs 
to demonstrate commonality with “‘[s]ignificant proof’ that Wal-Mart 
‘operated under a general policy of discrimination.”‘217 Applying this new 
elevated commonality standard, the Court concluded that the statistical 
disparities, anecdotal accounts, and “social framework” evidence218 
 
 
employees who suffered sex discrimination are unlikely ever to recover damages . . . . The 
larger concern is that big companies know that it will be much harder to sue them in class 
actions, and the unscrupulous ones will more often make the choice to enrich themselves at 
the expense of . . . employees. 
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 77. 
 211. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547. 
 212. Id. at 2548. 
 213. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). This is referred to as “commonality” and is satisfied when “there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class.” Commonality is one of four criteria that every class 
action must satisfy under Rule 23(a). They include: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder would be 
impracticable; (2) the class shares common questions of law or fact; (3) the representative parties’ 
claims or defenses are typical of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
represent the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  
 214. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2549. 
 215. Id. at 2556–57. 
 216. Falcon involved a lead plaintiff who alleged discrimination against Mexican-Americans. He 
alleged that he and a class of Mexican-American employees were subjected to intentional 
discrimination in promotions and that a class of Mexican-American applicants was subjected to 
disparate impact discrimination in hiring. 457 U.S. 147, 149–51 (1982). The Court found that there 
were no common questions between the plaintiff and the applicant class. Id. at 157–58. 
 217. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15).  
 218. Id. at 2549. 
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proffered fell short of demonstrating that there was sufficient glue to hold 
the class together.
219
 
The Court’s application of heightened commonality220 to the evidence 
in Dukes portends a difficult future for workers attempting to collectively 
challenge alleged discrimination.
221
 Dukes is flawed not only for its 
cramped analysis of the evidence in this case,
222
 but also its interpretation 
of commonality for future Title VII cases.
223
 The Court’s interpretation 
goes well beyond Rule 23’s text,224 its historical underpinnings,225 and 
decades of Title VII class action jurisprudence.
226
 Professor Arthur R. 
Miller even suggests that, like the pleading standard, the commonality 
standard may now have imported something akin to a “plausibility” 
requirement.
227
 
Professor Miller’s words of caution are well headed, given that one of 
the bases for the majority’s conclusion that commonality had not been met 
was the Court’s incredulity that an employer’s “undisciplined system of 
 
 
 219. Id. at 2556–57.  
 220. The Court elevated the commonality standard in a number of ways. See Malveaux, supra 
note 209, at 39, 42–43 (describing “same injury,” “common mode” necessary for commonality); 
Spencer, supra note 5, at 463–75 (describing new same injury, centrality, and efficiency requirements 
of commonality); see also Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 
773–80 (2013) (contending that the Court’s new requirement—a common question be central to the 
case—inappropriately imports a predominance standard into Rule 23(a)(2), in opposition to the 
drafters’ intent for Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes). Some fear that this more rigorous commonality 
standard for class actions will extend beyond class certification to other joinder and consolidation rules 
that include a common question element. See Spencer, supra note 5, at 447 & nn.34–35, 449 (citing 
various rules); Klonoff, supra, at 779 n.289 (same). 
 221. See Malveaux, supra note 209, at 40 (describing how “[t]he Court gave each type of evidence 
short shrift”). 
 222. Id. at 39–42 (criticizing Court for disaggregating the evidence, as opposed to considering the 
whole picture). 
 223. This, of course, depends on how lower courts understand the strictures of commonality post-
Dukes and the extent to which they follow them. See Spencer, supra note 5, at 445 & n.26 (“Some 
courts have been more circumspect in their understanding of Dukes, limiting the decision to its facts.”) 
(citing cases). 
 224. Spencer, supra note 5, at 444 (“Nothing in the language or history of Rule 23(a)(2) supports 
the Dukes majority’s interpretation of it.”); id. at 444–46 (explaining how Court’s new definition of 
commonality is untethered from the Rule’s text); see also Klonoff, supra note 220, at 776 (“The 
majority decision in Dukes cannot be squared with the text, structure, or history of Rule 23(a)(2). 
Nothing in the text of Rule 23(a)(2), or in the Advisory Committee Notes thereto, requires that the 
common question be central to the outcome.”). 
 225. Spencer, supra note 5, at 443–44; id. at 451–63 (describing how the Dukes interpretation of 
commonality is counter to the development of Rule 23 and its origins). 
 226. See Malveaux, supra note 209, at 38–39; see also Miller, supra note 8, at 318–19 (footnote 
omitted) (“Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes . . . has increased the burden of showing ‘significant proof’ 
of a general policy of discrimination in order to secure class certification. It did so by insisting on a 
showing of a higher level of ‘commonality’ under Rule 23(a)(2) . . . .”). 
 227. Miller, supra note 8, at 319 n.125. 
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subjective decisionmaking”—potentially actionable under Title VII—
could be the glue that held the class together.
228
 The Court’s skepticism, if 
not disbelief, that a majority of Wal-Mart’s managers might act—even 
subconsciously—in a way that disfavors women’s employment 
opportunities
229
 prevented the Court from reaching commonality.
230
 It 
stated, without support, that “left to their own devices most managers in 
any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids 
sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria 
for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”231 
The Court required plaintiffs to identify a “common mode” of how 
supervisors exercised their discretion throughout the company, but then 
rebuffed the statistics, affidavits, and expert evidence indicating that 
gender bias might be the modality.
232
 
The Court was further dubious of any systemic gender bias because of 
the existence of an official written anti-discrimination policy.
233
 
Juxtaposing this written policy with Wal-Mart’s policy of giving local 
supervisors unfettered discretion to make employment decisions, the Court 
concluded that plaintiffs had not met their evidentiary burden.
234
 In stark 
contrast, the dissent—comprised of all the female justices and Justice 
Breyer—had little difficulty concluding that Wal-Mart’s policy of 
unchecked discretion could result in systemic bias
235
 and, therefore, justify 
classwide treatment.
236
 
 
 
 228. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988)). 
 229. Plaintiffs contended that a “strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ permit[ted] bias against 
women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s 
thousands of managers.” Dukes 131 S. Ct. at 2548; id at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (describing the district court’s findings of Wal-Mart’s methods used to maintain its 
corporate culture). 
 230. Malveaux, supra note 209, at 43. 
 231. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (emphasis added). 
 232. See id. at 2554–55 (“[Plaintiffs] have not identified a common mode of exercising discretion 
that pervades the entire company—aside from their reliance on Dr. Bielby’s social frameworks 
analysis that we have rejected.”). Additionally, the Court noted that “[i]n a company of Wal-Mart’s 
size and geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion 
in a common way without some common direction. [Plaintiffs] attempt to make that showing by 
means of statistical and anecdotal evidence, but their evidence falls well short.” Id. at 2555. 
 233. Id. at 2553. See Malveaux, supra note 209, at 43. 
 234. Dukes, 132 S. Ct. at 2553–54. 
 235. The dissent stated: 
The practice of delegating to supervisors large discretion to make personnel decisions, 
uncontrolled by formal standards, has long been known to have the potential to produce 
disparate effects. Managers, like all humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are 
unaware. The risk of discrimination is heightened when those managers are predominantly of 
one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates gender stereotypes. 
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Professor A. Benjamin Spencer situates Dukes squarely within a 
current restrictive ethos procedural trend—where societal outgroups237 
asserting disfavored claims against the dominant class
238
 are increasingly 
restricted from court access and merits-based resolutions by higher 
procedural barriers.
239
 He appropriately expresses concern over the 
majority’s threshold skepticism of plaintiffs’ discrimination claims and 
conditional access to the civil litigation system.
240
 The Court’s demand 
that plaintiffs produce “significant proof” of a general policy of 
discrimination as a precursor to its finding commonality, and the Court’s 
reliance on its own prejudgment and worldview
241
 when ascertaining what 
quantum of proof suffices, is untenable.
242
 The Court’s deciding to hold 
plaintiffs who challenge systemic discrimination to a higher evidentiary 
standard
243
 for court access, and assessing the merits of those claims—
rather than leaving it to a jury
244—run counter to the Rules’ origins and the 
democratic process.
245
 
 
 
Id. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (concluding that “[i]t is hardly surprising that 
for many managers, the ideal candidate [is] someone with characteristics similar to their own”). 
 236. Finding no error of law or abuse of discretion, the dissent deferred to the district court’s 
findings indicating not only potential classwide disparate impact, but disparate treatment gender 
discrimination. In finding commonality, the district court relied on plaintiffs’ evidence suggesting a 
system of discretionary decisionmaking that operates uniformly across stores, a corporate culture that 
promotes gender bias, a company failure to check such bias, and pay and promotion disparities that 
“‘can be explained only by gender discrimination and not by . . . neutral variables.’” Id. at 2564–65 
(quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 155 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). 
 237. Professor Spencer explains that “[m]embers of societal outgroups are ‘those outside the 
political and cultural mainstream, particularly those challenging accepted legal principles and social 
norms . . . . [T]hose raising difficult and often tenuous claims that demand the reordering of 
established political, economic and social arrangements, that is, those at the system’s and society’s 
margins.’” Spencer, supra note 5, at 484 (quoting Yamamoto, supra note 42, at 345). 
 238. Professor Spencer juxtaposes “members of the dominant class, such as major corporations” 
against “members of disempowered groups.” Id. at 449. 
 239. Id. at 478.  
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 445 (describing how Wal-Mart created a heightened commonality standard under Rule 
23(a)(2), fueled in part by “[c]laimant animus, combined with hostility toward and a misunderstanding 
of claims of discrimination”). 
 242. Id. at 476 (footnote omitted) (“Threshold skepticism demands that before a court permits 
defendants to be subjected to the litigation process itself . . . claimants must demonstrate, up front, that 
their claims have merit.”). 
 243. This translates into higher financial costs as well. See supra note 116. 
 244. This approach contradicts the prohibition against conditioning class certification on merits 
that do not overlap with the certification criteria, as stated in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 
156, 177–78 (1974). See also Klonoff, supra note 220, at 756 (“Requiring district courts to resolve 
conflicting evidence in ruling on class certification impacts more than just timing and discovery issues. 
Ultimately, in cases in which the court denies certification because it credits defendant’s evidence over 
plaintiff’s evidence, . . . [this] approach usurps the jury’s role to weigh and adjudicate conflicting 
evidence.”). 
 245. Professor Spencer notes the unfairness of this heightened evidentiary burden on plaintiffs 
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The impact of heightened commonality on Title VII and other civil 
rights cases is still being revealed,
246
 but the direction does not look 
favorable. At the very least, Dukes hands defendants another tool for 
dismantling group action.
247
 Unquestionably, classes the size and scope of 
the one proposed in Dukes will become even rarer.
248
 But even classes of 
less magnitude and scope are suffering a fate similar to Dukes because of 
their underlying theory of liability. Like Dukes, many employment 
discrimination class actions are premised on excessive subjectivity as a 
discriminatory policy, which grounds Rule 23(a)(2) commonality. Thus, 
claimants arguing that a policy of unfettered discretionary decision-
making is a vehicle for systemic workplace discrimination and disparities 
face a more formidable battle post-Dukes.
249
 Dukes’s impact has gone 
 
 
challenging discrimination, and likens it to similar hurdles in the pleadings and summary judgment 
arena. Spencer, supra note 5, at 479–80; see Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now 
Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1867–68 (2008) (arguing that recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the motion to dismiss diverges from common law interpretation of the Seventh 
Amendment and noting that “[i]f a court determines that a plaintiff has not satisfied the standards from 
these cases—the plausibility requirements or the heightened pleading requirements—the case is 
dismissed at the pleading stage, which eliminates the plaintiff’s jury trial right.”); Suja A. Thomas, 
Essay, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 144 (2007) [hereinafter Why 
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional] (asserting that the Supreme Court has never decided whether 
summary judgment under Rule 56 is constitutional and arguing that it is not constitutional under the 
Seventh Amendment).  
 246. See Klonoff, supra note 220, at 778 (“The full reach of Dukes remains to be seen, and not 
surprisingly, the results are mixed.”). 
 247. See id. at 779 (“At a minimum, commonality almost certainly will become a standard part of 
a defendant’s attack on class certification.”). 
 248.  This is not surprising. Cases the magnitude and scope of Dukes are rare. Malveaux, supra 
note 209, at 44. Even among those sympathetic to the plaintiffs in Dukes concede that the class scope 
was ambitious. See, e.g., id. (“With 1.5 million potential class members nationwide, Dukes 
unquestionably tested the outer bounds of what it takes to hold a class together. Smaller classes are 
bound to be more successful.”); see also Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 163–64 (2012) (criticizing plaintiffs’ counsel in Dukes for, 
inter alia, not proposing regional and issue subclasses when seeking certification); see generally id. at 
173 (“[T]here is plenty of blame to go around, and some of it must go to the plaintiffs’ bar.”).  
 As I’ve mentioned elsewhere, the plaintiffs’ bar has adjusted by bringing smaller cases, which has 
its own drawbacks. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Power and Promise of Procedure: Examining the Class 
Action Landscape After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 659, 668 (2013). 
 249. See JOSEPH M. SELLERS, CLASS ACTIONS AFTER WAL-MART V. DUKES, AM. LAW INST. 113, 
114 (2013) (“[W]here plaintiffs challenge practices of discretionary decisionmaking, Dukes has been 
interpreted to mean that plaintiffs must show evidence of a common mode of exercising discretion 
. . . .”); see, e.g., Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 897–89 (7th Cir. 2012) (unanimous 
reversal of class certification of African-American journeymen alleging discrimination on grounds that 
supervisors given complete discretion to provide overtime opportunities did not satisfy commonality 
absent a common direction or guidance); Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 815–16 (8th Cir. 
2011) (affirming denial of class certification post-Dukes on grounds that all supervisors did not 
exercise their discretion in a common way); Valerino v. Holder, 283 F.R.D. 302, 318–19 (E.D. Va. 
2012) (court rejected argument that totally discretionary review process created companywide biased 
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even beyond Title VII and employment discrimination claims. Cases 
brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),
250
 the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA),
251
 and § 1981
252
 challenging lenders’ discretionary 
pricing policies as discriminatory have also suffered this fate.
253
 
Post-Dukes, workers are being forced to engage the merits of their 
discrimination claims more at the class certification stage. To satisfy 
commonality, some judges are now requiring a stronger causal connection 
between an employer’s discretionary decision-making policy, on the one 
hand, and an observed disparity or adverse employment action, on the 
other—thereby making it more difficult for employees to act 
collectively.
254
 
 
 
testing procedure that would satisfy commonality for class of U.S. Marshals Service employees 
alleging gender discrimination in promotions and transfers). 
 But see, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 490 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (reversing denial of class certification for class of African-American brokers alleging pay 
discrimination under Title VII and section 1981 on grounds that individual managers exercised their 
discretion under the influence of companywide policies, thereby distinguishing Dukes); Cronas v. 
Willis Group Holdings, Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 15295(RMB), 2011 WL 5007976, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 
2011) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011)) (holding that 
commonality was satisfied because “‘whether the excessive subjectivity in pay and promotion 
decisionmaking . . . had a disparate impact on female officers’ . . . ‘is capable of classwide resolution 
. . . .’”). 
 250. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006). 
 251. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006). 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
 253. See, e.g., Barrett v. Option One Mortg. Corp., No. 08-10157-RWZ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
132775, at *9-13 (D. Ma. Sept. 18, 2012) (where class of African-American borrowers challenged 
defendant’s loan pricing policy under the ECOA and FHA as discriminatory because it gave brokers 
discretion to impose non-creditworthy charges, court decertified class post-Dukes on basis that brokers 
did not have a “common mode” of exercising their discretion); In re Countrywide Fin. Mortg. Lending 
Practices Litig., No. 08-MD-1974, 2011 WL 4862174, at *1-4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011) (denying 
certification of a putative class of plaintiffs alleging that Countrywide violated the anti-discriminatory 
lending provisions of the ECOA, the FHA, and the Civil Rights Act because the plaintiffs failed to 
show that defendant’s discretionary policy of allowing brokers to exercise autonomy to form “teams” 
to sign up new clients and share and service existing clients amounted to a common method of 
discrimination), aff’d sub nom. Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 708 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2013); 
Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 277 F.R.D. 148, 155 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (denying class certification in a 
case alleging violations of the FHA and ECOA and explaining that under Dukes, “[p]laintiffs would 
likely have to show the disparate impact and analysis for each loan officer or at a minimum each group 
of loan officers working for a specific supervisor”), aff’d, 726 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Wells 
Fargo Residential Mortg. Lending Discrimination Litig., No. 08-MD-01930, 2011 WL 3903117, at *1-
5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (denying certification of a putative class alleging that Wells Fargo’s 
discretionary pricing program violated the FHA and the ECOA because plaintiffs did not establish that 
the discretionary pricing program amounted to a common mode of discrimination as required by 
Dukes).  
 254. See Malveaux, supra note 209, at 44–45 (discussing risks involved). Employment 
discrimination claims are not the only ones experiencing a higher certification hurdle. Similarly, in the 
antitrust area, the Court reiterated the rigorous analysis and consideration of the merits when they 
overlap with class certification criteria, as set forth in Dukes. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. 
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In Dukes, the Court favored a demanding examination of the merits 
that touch on any class certification criteria over an arms-length, more 
suspended approach. This decision put to rest a debate among lower courts 
over how to interpret Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline
255
 and General 
Telephone Co. v. Falcon.
256
 
Eisen’s prohibition of certification conditioned on the merits and 
Falcon’s insistence on a rigorous class certification analysis split the 
federal courts of appeals over the extent to which courts should address 
merits at the class certification stage.
257
 Dukes resolved this debate, 
clarifying that Eisen was no bar to determining the merits when they 
overlapped with certification standards and that the “class determination 
generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and 
legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.”258 However, Dukes 
went so far as to condition class certification on whether plaintiffs could 
provide significant proof of a discriminatory policy—in direct 
contravention of Eisen’s prohibition. Thus, the Court has singled out Title 
VII cases for special treatment, subjecting plaintiffs to harsher court-entry 
when acting collectively.
259
 
 
 
Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (reversing certification of Rule 23(b)(3) class where lower court refrained from 
addressing inconsistency between plaintiffs’ expert’s damages model and classwide theory of 
liability). 
 255. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 256. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). In Eisen, the Supreme Court made clear: 
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority 
to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may 
be maintained as a class action. . . . “[I]n determining the propriety of a class action, the 
question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail 
on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” 
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177–78 (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int’l, Inc., 452 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
However, in Falcon, the Supreme Court explained: 
[S]ometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to 
rest on the certification question. . . . [A] Title VII class action, like any other class action, 
may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the 
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) [and one of Rule 23(b)] have been satisfied. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160–61. 
 257. See generally Klonoff, supra note 220, at 745–51 (describing different court interpretations). 
 258. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 259. Dukes still left open questions about the extent to which merits should be considered and the 
amount of proof necessary at class certification. For example, Dukes did not speak definitively on 
whether expert testimony at the class certification stage should be subjected to a Daubert analysis, but 
instead offered this dicta: “The District Court concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert 
testimony at the certification stage of class-action proceedings. We doubt that this is so . . . .” Id. at 
2553–54 (citations omitted); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding 
that for expert testimony to be admissible, the trial judge must determine “that an expert’s testimony 
both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand”). Courts remain divided over the 
propriety of subjecting experts to the Daubert test at class certification. See Malveaux, supra note 248, 
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The Court’s stricter gatekeeping stance not only potentially bars group 
relief, but also elevates the amount of discovery—and subsequent costs 
and time—necessary to penetrate the class certification wall. This creates 
all the more reason for discovery to be generous in kind and scope. On the 
contrary, the trajectory for discovery has been increasingly constrictive.
260
 
Emboldened by the obstructionist civil litigation environment—set forth 
by Iqbal and Dukes—employers are now seeking to dismiss class claims 
on the face of the complaint pre-discovery,
261
 and some are prevailing.
262
  
Plaintiffs are adjusting to the harsher certification climate to minimize 
the potentially damaging impact of Dukes. Plaintiffs’ counsel is bringing 
smaller cases that are more geographically limited
263
 to create a tighter 
nexus between decision-makers and alleged discriminatory conduct. Other 
strategies include seeking issue certification under Rule 23(c)(4),
264
 
 
 
at 670, 670 n.52 (citing cases); SELLERS, supra note 249, at 3 (“Courts post-Dukes have reached varied 
conclusions . . . .”); Klonoff, supra note 220, at 758–61 (describing conflicting approaches by courts). 
 260. See generally Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 
DUKE L.J. 669, 674–88 (2010) (discussing the trend toward greater judicial management of discovery 
to address concerns over cost and delay and concomitant narrowing of discovery). 
 261. SELLERS, supra note 249, at 115 (“In reliance on Dukes, defendants have launched earlier 
and more aggressive efforts to dismiss or strike class allegations arguing that the theories alleged do 
not satisfy the certification standards set forth in Dukes or to attempt to deny certification prior to 
plaintiffs’ filing a motion to certify.”). 
 262. See, e.g., Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 949–50 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding district court’s dismissal of class allegations and not granting plaintiffs additional time or 
discovery). According to Dukes’s class counsel, Joseph M. Sellers, thus far this approach has been the 
minority one. See SELLERS, supra note 249, at 115 (citing cases). See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., No. C 01-02252 CRB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135554, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2012) (denying 
Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss class claims challenging discretionary decision-making as 
discriminatory in narrower regional class post–Dukes). 
 263. Following Dukes, the plaintiffs narrowed their class definition to female employees in the 
California area. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Wal-
Mart’s motion to dismiss and stated that it would later consider the motion for certification. See Dukes 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C 01-02252 CRB, 2012 WL 4329009, at *2, *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 
2012), perm. app. denied, No. C 01-02252 CRB, 2012 WL 6115536; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
No. C 01-2252 CRB, 2013 WL 149685, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) (denying Wal-Mart’s request 
for leave to file a motion for reconsideration); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 13-80184, 2013 
U.S. App. LEXIS 23703 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2013) (denying petition for permission to appeal order 
denying class certification). Similar regional actions have been filed in Texas, Florida, and Tennessee. 
See Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-02954-O, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1879 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 
7, 2013); Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-619590-Civ., 2013 WL 5434565 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 
2013) Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). 
 264. Rule 23(c)(4) states: “When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (certifying a Rule 23(c)(4) class on the issue of whether Merrill Lynch’s 
employment policies had a disparate impact on African-American employees); United States v. City of 
New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Issue certification of bifurcated liability-phase 
questions is fully consistent with Wal-Mart’s careful attention to the distinct procedural protections 
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creating subclasses,
265
 defining the class more narrowly,
266
 distinguishing 
Dukes,
267
 filing class actions in state court,
268
 and relying on statutes other 
than Title VII to challenge certain employment practices.
269
 These 
strategies come with costs, some at their peril.
270
 
In sum, the Court’s heightened commonality standard, like the pleading 
one, potentially undermines court access and denies formal resolution on 
the merits, but on an even larger scale. Withholding class certification—
especially in cases involving small value claims and poor claimants—may 
deny relief altogether for such litigants
271
 and compromise enforcement of 
anti-discrimination statutes more generally.
272
 
 
 
attending (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes.”); see generally Klonoff, supra note 220, at 807–15 (describing 
conflicting views over propriety of issue certification and different court approaches). 
 265. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses that 
are each treated as a class under this rule.”); see, e.g., Calloway v. Caraco Pharm. Lab., Ltd., 287 
F.R.D. 402, 408–09 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (certifying two subclasses of pharmaceutical employees who 
alleged that they were laid off without receiving proper notice). 
 266. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming the bankruptcy 
court’s grant of certification for plaintiffs’ redefined class). See also class actions filed post-Dukes 
against Wal-Mart, supra note 263. 
 267. See, e.g., Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30, 31–33 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(denying defendant’s motion to decertify a class of 8500 children in custody of the Massachusetts 
Department of Children and Families, alleging constitutional violations, and noting that the Dukes 
decision “did not change the law for all class action certifications”); Gray v. Golden Gate Nat’l 
Recreation Area, 279 F.R.D. 501, 518–19 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (certifying a 23(b)(2) class of disabled 
citizens seeking an injunction under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, and stating that “[t]hough 
the Supreme Court did not expressly limit its holding in [Dukes] to Title VII employment 
discrimination cases, Plaintiffs’ arguments [that the decision should not apply to injunctive actions 
under the Rehabilitation Act] are generally persuasive”), stay granted pending motion for interlocutory 
appeal, No. C 08-00722, 2011 WL 6934433 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011); Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 
10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *1-4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011) (granting certification of a portion of a 
class of insurance policyholders who were denied coverage for autism treatment, distinguishing the 
facts of the case from Dukes, noting Cigna had a clear nationwide policy to deny certain autism 
treatments, and thus finding the Dukes holding “inapposite” in the present case); see also Miller, supra 
note 8, at 320 n.127 (noting that collective actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
have been largely exempt from Dukes’s restrictive commonality trend); SELLERS, supra note 249, at 1, 
13–26 (same) (citing cases). 
 268. See, e.g., Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014) (reversing lower court’s 
dismissal of class action claim alleging violations of Washington’s Law Against Discrimination). 
 269. For example, plaintiffs challenging employment practices based on gender discrimination are 
turning more to the Equal Pay Act post-Dukes. SELLERS, supra note 249, at 1, 3–4 (identifying Equal 
Pay Act—although imperfect—as option post-Dukes). 
 270. For example, a smaller class may be less likely to yield empirical data that is statistically 
significant, thereby making it more difficult—if not impossible—to meet the certification threshold. 
Divide and conquer—tried and true. 
 271. Miller, supra note 8, at 318 (“Realistically, the choice for class members is between 
collective access to the judicial system or no access at all.”); id. at 322 (“[M]any cases will not be 
pursued because they are not economically viable on behalf of individual class members, most 
particularly those having negative-value claims.”). 
 272. See George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class 
Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 29 (2012) (“In sum, the holding on commonality in Wal-Mart 
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2. Restrictive Certification Options for Back Pay Relief 
273
 
In addition to calcifying commonality, Dukes stripped workers’ 
capacity to seek back pay under Title VII as a class under Rule 23(b)(2). 
Like many employees challenging systemic discrimination, the Dukes 
plaintiffs sought not only injunctive and declaratory relief, but also back 
pay, under Rule 23(b)(2). Back pay is critical because it not only makes 
plaintiffs “whole,” but also encourages voluntary compliance with the law 
and deters future misconduct.
274
 
The Court’s unanimous ruling that back pay was not appropriate under 
the circumstances effectively reversed almost a half-century of Title VII 
jurisprudence.
275
 Courts typically allowed back pay for civil rights cases 
under Rule 23(b)(2) on the basis that this monetary relief is equitable and 
critical to Title VII’s remedial scheme.276 Even appellate courts with the 
most taxing class certification standards have recognized that back pay is 
consistent with the Rule’s constraints.277 One of the primary purposes of 
 
 
diminishes the prospect of certification and in doing so, diminishes the likelihood that a class action 
will be brought. The net effect is to reduce the defendant’s exposure to class-wide liability and the 
deterrent effect of class actions generally.”).  
 273. This section draws heavily from my prior work, Malveaux, supra note 209 . 
 274. See 118 CONG. REC. 7166–70 (1972) (remarks made by Sen. Williams in a section-by-
section analysis of The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972); see also United States v. N.L. 
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973) (describing the compensatory and deterrent functions of 
back pay). Because of the primacy of this monetary relief, there is a presumption in its favor when 
discrimination is established. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419–21 & n.12 (1975); 
see also 1–2 JANICE GOODMAN, MARY ANN OAKLEY, ALICE D. BONNER, EDITH BARNETT & 
SUZANNE SANGREE, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION § 2.10[2][a][i] (2010) (“Back pay is the most 
common form of monetary relief in Title VII cases . . . [and is] . . . routinely granted barring 
extraordinary circumstances.”); id. (“[T]he denial of back pay to prevailing plaintiffs is a minor 
exception rather than the rule.”). 
 275. In the first Title VII post-Dukes case, the federal district court concluded: “In so holding, a 
unanimous Supreme Court reduced to rubble more than forty years of precedent in the Courts of 
Appeals, which had long held that backpay is recoverable in employment discrimination class actions 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2).” United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); 
see 5 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 92.11[1] (2d ed. 2011) (citing cases to 
support the assertion that “the majority of courts have had little difficulty fitting an action for back pay 
and injunctive relief into Rule 23(b)(2)”). 
 276. Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions at the Crossroads: An Answer to Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 5 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (2011) (discussing same). See, e.g., City of New York, 276 F.R.D. at 31–
34 & n.3; Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 169 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting 
cases); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415–16 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Of course, to 
the extent the district court applied an incidental damages standard to the plaintiffs’ claims for back 
pay, its analysis was flawed.”); id. at 425 (“[W]e hold that nonequitable monetary relief may be 
obtained in a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(2) only if the predominant relief sought is 
injunctive or declaratory.”) (emphasis added). 
 277. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 618–19 & n.40 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541 (2011) (citing cases adopting the “consensus view” and noting that “it is . . . well accepted, 
even by circuits that are generally restrictive in certifying classes seeking monetary damages under 
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Rule 23(b)(2) was to permit civil rights class actions seeking equitable 
relief,
278
 including back pay. The Advisory Committee Notes make clear 
that Rule 23(b)(2) permits monetary relief, and that the rule was designed 
with civil rights at its core.
279
  
Notwithstanding this history, Dukes conditioned the availability of 
back pay on whether it was incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief 
sought, not on whether it was equitable in nature.
280
 The Court concluded 
that Wal-Mart had a right to individualized rather than formulaic back pay 
determinations, which meant that such relief was not incidental to the 
class-wide injunction and declaration.
281
  
Dukes makes it more difficult for employees alleging systemic 
misconduct under Title VII to seek monetary relief because it is harder for 
them to use the Rule 23 provision designed for such cases—(b)(2). First, 
the Court does not distinguish between equitable and non-equitable 
monetary relief as a basis for (b)(2) certification. Thus, back pay no longer 
gets preferential treatment over compensatory and punitive damages 
because of its equitable nature. Second, any monetary relief that is not 
incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought cannot meet the 
(b)(2) test.
282
 Dukes requires circuits like the Second and Ninth, and those 
who had yet to weigh in on the matter, to adopt the harshest standard
283
 for 
 
 
Rule 23(b)(2), that a request for back pay in a Title VII case is fully compatible with the certification 
of a Rule 23(b)(2) class”). 
 278. The Advisory Committee Notes make this clear. See FED. R CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s 
note. 
 279. This is demonstrated by the Committee’s Rule 23(b)(2) examples: “Illustrative are various 
actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, 
usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.” FED. R CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note. 
 280. The Court held that monetary relief may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) where such 
relief is not “incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011). 
 281. Although the Court never explicitly adopted the Fifth Circuit’s “incidental” test for 
determining whether monetary relief is permitted under Rule 23(b)(2), which is set forth in Allison v. 
Citgo Petroleum Corp., the Court applied the test to plaintiffs’ back pay claims, and concluded that 
such relief failed. See id. at 2560–61. 
 282. See Miller, supra note 8, at 319 n.125. 
 283. The Supreme Court has arguably taken a position harsher than any circuit, including the 
Fifth Circuit—which permitted back pay in (b)(2) civil rights cases. Klonoff, supra note 220, at 790. 
 All of the federal courts of appeals that have addressed the question of whether monetary 
relief—more specifically, damages—is allowed under Rule 23(b)(2) have concluded that such relief is 
permitted so long as it does not predominate over the injunctive or declaratory relief. See Malveaux, 
supra note 209, at 49 n.89 (citing cases). While the Rule itself does not mention predominance, the 
Advisory Committee Notes state that so long as the appropriate final relief does not relate “exclusively 
or predominantly to money damages,” (b)(2) certification is appropriate. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 
advisory committee’s note. Because of the Rule’s silence on the matter, the circuit courts have 
uniformly relied on this guidance. Their only disagreement was how predominance should be 
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determining the availability of relief other than injunctive or declaratory 
relief.
284
 Third, courts are more inclined to conclude that back pay must be 
determined on an individualized, rather than aggregate, basis. This, in turn, 
would make back pay non-incidental, and therefore uncertifiable under 
Rule 23(b)(2).
285
 Because of the more demanding certification standard 
under Rule 23(b)(2), employees may opt not to seek monetary relief, or a 
Title VII class action at all. Others may attempt certification under the 
alternative class action provision, Rule 23(b)(3), which has its own 
drawbacks. 
Shunting Title VII and other civil rights claims of group harm into Rule 
23(b)(3) may also allude survival. First, the certification onus is greater: 
certification is available only if common issues predominate over 
individual ones and a class action is superior to other mechanisms for 
resolving the dispute.
286
 Post-Dukes, once a court determines that back pay 
must be calculated on an individualized basis, this raises the specter that 
individual issues predominate over common ones, thus foreclosing Rule 
23(b)(3), as well as (b)(2), certification.
287
 
The predominance test under (b)(3) itself is becoming more arduous.
288
 
For instance, in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
289
 the Court reversed 
 
 
determined. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 615–17 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541 (2011) (explaining Ninth Circuit’s “objective effects” test); Robinson v. Metro-North 
Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162–64 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining Second Circuit’s ad hoc 
balancing test); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining Fifth 
Circuit’s popular “incidental” test);. Malveaux, supra note 276, at 400–13 (conducting comparative 
analysis of predominance tests); see also Malveaux, supra note 196, at 412–13 (criticizing Fifth 
Circuit’s approach set forth in Allison); W. Lyle Stamps, Commentary, Getting Title VII Back on 
Track: Leaving Allison Behind for the Robinson Line, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 411, 411 (2003) (same). 
Dukes rejected a predominance test altogether. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559–60. 
 284. Moreover, post-Dukes, the indivisible nature of relief—including declaratory and injunctive 
relief—is relevant to (b)(2) certification. SELLERS, supra note 249, at 2. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557; 
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(Dukes established that “the key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or 
declaratory remedy warranted”); Klonoff, supra note 220, at 791. 
 Dukes did not answer one of the questions for which it granted review: whether any monetary 
relief is appropriate under (b)(2), which mentions only the propriety of class-wide injunctive and 
declaratory relief. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Defendant-Appellant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277). The Court did not prohibit monetary relief. Instead, it 
prohibited individualized relief—whether monetary, injunctive or declaratory. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 
2557 (“[A]t a minimum, claims for individualized relief (like the backpay at issue here) do not satisfy 
the Rule [23(b)(2)].”); see, e.g., Gulino v. Bd. of Educ., 907 F.Supp.2d 492, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557) ((b)(2) certification “is not appropriate ‘when each member of the 
class would be entitled to a different injunction’”). 
 285. See generally Malveaux, supra note 209, at 51. 
 286. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 287. See Malveaux, supra note 209, at 48. 
 288. See Klonoff, supra note 220, at 792 (“[I]n recent years, the courts have made it far more 
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certification of a class of two million Comcast subscribers alleging that the 
company engaged in anti-competitive behavior, in violation of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
290
 Emphasizing the need for a “rigorous 
analysis” post-Dukes, the Court required plaintiffs’ damages model to be 
consistent with their theory of liability for certification under Rule 
23(b)(3).
291
 Comcast did not adopt the position that there must be class-
wide proof of everything at issue to satisfy (b)(3) predominance at the 
class certification stage. However, emboldened by the opinion, some 
courts may require plaintiffs to prove that damages can be calculated on a 
class-wide basis as a condition of Rule 23(b)(3) certification.
292
 
Second, civil rights plaintiffs have historically challenged systemic 
discrimination under (b)(2), partly to avoid the more onerous costs and 
burdens under (b)(3).
293
 Because the latter is not as cohesive and 
homogeneous as the former, class members must be provided notice of a 
(b)(3) class action and an opportunity to opt out of the litigation.
294
 
 
 
difficult to certify class actions under (b)(3) by summarily finding, after identifying significant 
individualized issues, that predominance cannot be satisfied. They do so without carefully weighing 
those individualized issues against the common issues.”). 
 289. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 290. Id. at 1430, 1435. 
 291. Id. at 1433–35. The conservative majority stated: 
[I]t is clear that, under the proper standard for evaluating certification, respondents’ model 
falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis. 
Without presenting another methodology, respondents cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance: Questions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm 
questions common to the class. 
Id. at 1433. The dissent, on the other hand, attempts to reign in the interpretation that individualized 
damages precludes Rule 23(b)(3) certification on predominance grounds. Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg & 
Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 292. See John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Geoffrey M. Wyatt, From Cable TV to Washing 
Machines: The Supreme Court Cracks Down on Class Actions, BNA INSIGHTS (May 24, 2013), 
http://www.bna.com/from-cable-tv-to-washing-machines-the-supreme-court-cracks-down-on-class-
actions/ (“[It] also follows from the Comcast decision that plaintiffs must put forth a method sufficient 
to calculate damages on a classwide basis in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.”); see, e.g., Roach v. T. L. 
Cannon Corp., No. 3:10-cv-0591, 2013 WL 1316452, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013) (post-Comcast, 
class certification must be denied under Rule 23(b)(3) where plaintiffs do not produce a “damages 
model susceptible of measurement across the entire class”). But see Munoz v. PHH Corp., No. 1:08-
cv-0759-AWI-BAM, 2013 WL 2146925, at *24 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2013) (“The Comcast decision 
does not infringe on the long-standing principle that individual class member damage calculations are 
permissible in a certified class under Rule 23(b)(3).”); see, e.g., Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 
F.3d 510, 514–16 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that class certification denial was abuse of discretion where 
court required class-wide, over individualized proof of damages, and clarifying that Comcast does not 
require otherwise). 
 293. A class action may also be brought under Rule 23(b)(1), but this is inapplicable for most civil 
rights actions. 
 294. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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Therefore, even if plaintiffs can clear the (b)(3) certification hurdle, the 
cost of sending out class notices may be prohibitive.
295
 
Thus, between the more rigorous Dukes incidental test for monetary 
relief under (b)(2), and the tougher predominance test and costs and 
burdens associated with (b)(3), some employees alleging systemic 
discrimination may be foreclosed from bringing a class action 
altogether
296—risking under-enforcement. 
Like the response to heightened commonality, plaintiffs’ counsel is 
adjusting to Rule 23(b)(2)’s incidental relief test to minimize the 
damaging impact of Dukes. Employees bringing a pattern-or-practice 
employment discrimination case involving monetary relief are seeking 
certification solely under Rule 23(b)(3)
297
 or more promisingly a hybrid 
approach—where group-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is sought 
under Rule 23(b)(2) and individualized monetary relief is sought under 
Rule 23(b)(3).
298
 This approach addresses due process concerns by giving 
defendants the opportunity to raise individual affirmative defenses under 
Title VII, and by giving employees notice of the litigation and the 
occasion to opt out of a class whose cohesion is admittedly compromised 
by divergent monetary interests.
299
 This lifeline, however, is cast in a sea 
raging against plaintiffs more generally, as discussed below.   
 
 
 295. See Malveaux, supra note 209, at 48; see also Malveaux, supra note 196, at 425–26. 
 296. As class action expert Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., notes, this may be the most significant 
problem Dukes poses for future employment discrimination cases: 
The simple truth is that employment discrimination litigation cannot normally be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3) because of the “predominance” requirement of that rule . . . . Even in a 
far simpler, more streamlined case than [Dukes], there will still typically be a host of 
individual issues that will make it difficult (and usually impossible) to satisfy that 
predominance standard. 
John C. Coffee, Jr., “You Just Can’t Get There from Here”: A Primer on Wal-Mart v. Dukes, BNA 
INSIGHTS (July 19, 2011) (citation omitted). 
 297. See, e.g., Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 298. See SELLERS, supra note 249, at 2–3 (citing cases); see, e.g., Gulino v. Bd. of Educ., 907 F. 
Supp. 2d 492, 505–06, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (permitting (b)(2) certification of class-wide relief 
(declaratory judgment and appointment of monitor) and decertifying back pay claims and 
individualized injunctive relief under (b)(2), with (b)(3) option); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 
F.3d 970, 986–88 (9th Cir. 2011) (injunctive, declaratory and class-wide punitive damages potentially 
certifiable under (b)(2) and compensatory damages and back pay potentially certifiable under (b)(3)); 
Easterling v. Conn. Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.R.D. 41, 48–51 (D. Conn. 2011) (granting plaintiffs’ request 
to modify certification of liability and class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief under (b)(2) and 
monetary and individualized injunctive relief under (b)(3)). 
 299. See generally Malveaux, supra note 209, at 51–52. 
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3. Higher and More Hurdles to Class Certification 
Not only must those alleging employment and other types of 
discrimination clear Rule 23 class certification hurdles with them in 
mind,
300
 they must also clear an increasing number of hurdles applicable to 
plaintiffs in general. These include, inter alia, stricter class definition 
standards,
301
 greater scrutiny of numerosity,
302
 and elevated concern over 
adequacy of representation.
303
 
Even when employees and other civil rights litigants are successful at 
class certification, their success runs the risk of being short lived because 
of increased access to appellate review. Since 1998, the federal appellate 
courts and the Supreme Court have had the discretion to hear direct 
appeals of class certification grants and denials under Rule 23(f).
304
 This 
interlocutory challenge—largely exercised by defendants305—not only 
drains plaintiffs’ resources and time,306 but usually results in their 
defeat.
307
 For example, a study examining Rule 23(f) appeals from 1998 to 
 
 
 300. These include those under Dukes discussed supra. 
 301. See Klonoff, supra note 220, at 761–68 (discussing more recent development of more 
rigorous and conflicting class definition standards, contrary to the 1966 to 2000 period). 
 302. See id. at 768–73 (describing trend toward requiring more evidentiary proof of numerosity, 
even where common sense would suggest the criteria is met). Every case must meet the numerosity 
requirement set forth in Rule 23(a)(1) to be certified as a class action. Rule 23(a)(1) states: “One or 
more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if 
[] the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” FED. R. CIV P. 23(a)(1). 
 303. See Klonoff, supra note 220, at 780–88 (describing evolution of adequacy concerns based on 
omitted claims and discussing differences among courts). Every case must meet the adequacy of 
representation requirement set forth in Rule 23(a)(4) to be certified as a class action. Rule 23(a)(4) 
requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). In Dukes, the Court expressed concern over plaintiffs’ decision to forego 
compensatory damages to enhance their likelihood of obtaining class certification under Rule 23(b)(2). 
See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559. The Court noted that plaintiffs’ strategy might preclude class members 
from being able to seek compensatory damages in the future on collateral estoppel grounds. Id. 
Dukes’s concern is not surprising given an increasing groundswell of similar concerns by other courts 
in discrimination cases, and a more general trend toward questioning adequacy on the basis of omitted 
claims. See Klonoff, supra note 220, at 781–87 (describing discrimination cases). 
 304. The Rule states: “A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying 
class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit 
clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court 
unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). See 7B CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§§ 1802–1802.2 (3d ed. 2005) (describing Rule 23(f) application of discretionary interlocutory 
review). 
 305. Miller, supra note 8, at 322 n.133 (“Interlocutory appellate review, not surprisingly, is used 
most frequently by defendants.”). 
 306. Id. at 322 (noting cost and delay of interlocutory appellate review process). 
 307. Klonoff, supra note 220, at 741 (“In short, with respect to appellate court review pursuant to 
Rule 23(f), defendants have benefitted more from Rule 23(f) than have plaintiffs.”). 
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2012 reveals that the Rule largely favors defendants.
308
 More specifically, 
of the appeals accepted, approximately 69% were from defendants and 
31% from plaintiffs.
309
 Of the appeals by defendants (to reverse class 
certification), they were successful 70% of the time.
310
 By contrast, of the 
appeals by plaintiffs, they were successful only 30% of the time.
311
 Thus, 
in today’s climate, plaintiffs can expect class certification to be second-
guessed and likely overruled. 
Plaintiffs permitted to seek class certification at all are the fortunate 
ones.
312
 Arbitration agreements that compel employees to forgo class 
actions—along with other procedural protections—are increasingly found 
in employment contracts
313
 and enforced by the courts. The Supreme 
Court’s endorsement of arbitration over the last quarter century314 has 
encouraged employers to increasingly condition employment on an 
individual’s willingness to forego court access.315 This endorsement has 
contributed to a burgeoning practice by employers to insert non-negotiable 
arbitration clauses in their employment contracts
316—forcing employees to 
prospectively waive court access. Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
 
 
 308. Klonoff, supra note 220, at 741–42, app. at 832–38 (listing “[o]utcomes of cases appealed 
under Rule 23(f) between Nov. 30, 1998 and May 31, 2012”). The study excludes defendant classes 
and cases in which Rule 23(f) review was sought and denied. Id. at 832 n.593. The study is comprised 
of only published cases (including those in LEXIS and Westlaw). Id. Moreover, because courts do not 
always cite Rule 23(f), some cases may be missing. Id. 
 309. Id. at 741. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rodgers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 118–22 (2011); David S. 
Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 267 (2012) (AT&T v. 
Concepcion essentially “destroys . . . employment class actions”).  
 313. Pre-dispute compulsory arbitration agreements in the employment arena have been on the 
rise. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Is It the “Real Thing”?: How Coke’s One-Way Binding Arbitration 
May Bridge the Divide between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 77, 80 available at 
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss1/4 (footnote omitted) (“There has been a 
proliferation of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment contracts over the last 
fifteen years. At least one-fifth of all employees are subject to mandatory arbitration.”); id. at 80 
nn.11–12 (citing sources and empirical support, including Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller’s 
empirical analysis of 2,858 corporate contracts, which “revealed that employment contracts are more 
likely to have arbitration clauses than other types of contracts; arbitration clauses appeared in 37 
percent of employment contracts (the highest percentage among the thirteen contract types studied), 
but appeared in only 11 percent of all the corporate contracts studied”). A troubling feature of those 
agreements—the class action ban—is consequently on the rise. See Malveaux, supra note 109, at 639; 
Miller, supra note 8, at 323 & nn.140–41. 
 314. Malveaux, supra note 313, at 82 & 82 n.26 (citing cases); id. at 83 n.37 (citing Supreme 
Court cases approving of arbitration in civil rights and employment discrimination cases). 
 315. Id. at 83. 
 316. Id. at 80 nn.11–12 (citing sources and empirical support). 
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encouraged employers’ inserting class action bans in such clauses.317 For 
example, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
318
 the Court held that the 
Federal Arbitration Act pre-empted California’s judicial rule that classified 
certain class action bans in arbitration agreements as unconscionable.
319
 In 
a closely contested ruling, the conservative majority concluded that a state 
could not condition the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the 
availability of a class action.
320
 
Consequently, to the extent that those with small claims and resources 
are unlikely to challenge powerful corporate employers on their own, class 
arbitration bans will function as exculpatory clauses. Where arbitration 
agreements are relatively employee-friendly, individuals may vindicate 
individual harms. But where systemic, company-wide discrimination 
occurs, a class arbitration ban will shield an employer from accounting for 
widespread discrimination.
321
 
Indeed, in the context of an antitrust case, the Supreme Court has said 
so much. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,
322
 the 
Court held enforceable a class arbitration waiver where it was proven that 
in the absence of collective action, the law would go unenforced.
323
 In 
 
 
 317. Malveaux, supra note 109, at 642 (“In light of AT&T Mobility, companies are even more 
likely to insert class action bans in their pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration agreements.”). 
 318. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). For a critical analysis of the case, see Malveaux, supra note 109, at 
640–43. 
 319. 131 S. Ct. at 1745–48. 
 320. Id. at 1744, 1753. 
 321. The Supreme Court’s unwavering deference to federal arbitration has spurred renewed 
interest in the Arbitration Fairness Act and other legislation designed to curb mandatory, pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in employment adhesion contracts. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 
878, 113th Cong. (finding that “[a] series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States have 
interpreted the [Federal Arbitration] Act so that it now extends to consumer disputes and employment 
disputes, contrary to the intent of Congress” and amending the Federal Arbitration Act so that “no 
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an 
employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute”); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (same). 
 322. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). For a critical discussion of the case, see Suzette M. Malveaux, An 
Unrecognized Blockbuster; Amex and Class Arbitration, ACSBLOG (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/an-unrecognized-blockbuster-amex-and-class-arbitration, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EBX6-JYLD. 
 323. The issue before the lower courts was whether the class arbitration waiver was enforceable 
where the merchants had established that costs made it impossible for them to arbitrate their claims 
individually. American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2308. The evidence demonstrated that the cost of an 
expert analysis necessary to prove the plaintiff merchants’ claims (“at least several hundred thousand 
dollars, and might exceed $1 million”) far surpassed each individuals’ potential recovery (some by ten 
times). Id. In the absence of any possibility of cost-sharing with American Express, this made the class 
action the only viable way to proceed. Id. at 2318–19 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Without a mechanism for 
aggregating the costs of litigation, it would be impossible for the merchants to challenge defendant’s 
alleged unlawful business practices. Id. In a 5 to 3 decision, the conservative majority with Justice 
Kennedy concluded that even if a proposed class of plaintiffs proves that it is economically infeasible 
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short, employers not able to litigate their way out of class actions may 
contract their way out instead.
324
 And if class actions are the only realistic 
way the law will be enforced, employers have effectively contracted
325
 
immunity.
326
  
In sum, the elevated class action hurdle potentially jeopardizes court 
access, law enforcement, and efficient resolutions of potentially 
meritorious Title VII cases.
327
 
C. Other Procedural Barriers 
In addition to these more recent procedural roadblocks, there are a host 
of other mechanisms that fall more harshly on civil rights litigants, a few 
of which are mentioned here. More specifically, employees and 
discrimination victims have taken adverse blows in the areas of summary 
judgment, sanctions, and discovery. 
1. Summary Judgment 
It is well established that the summary judgment standard—heightened 
by the Supreme Court’s Celotex trilogy in 1986328—makes it easier for 
 
 
to individually pursue their cases in arbitration, an arbitration agreement that forbids them from 
bringing the case as a class action is enforceable under the FAA. Id. at 2312. Pursuant to an 
agreement’s terms, a party is compelled to pursue its claim individually—regardless of whether 
individual arbitration is impossible or irrational to bring. Id. at 2309, 2311. 
 324. One caveat is Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter. 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013). Sutter 
unanimously concluded that an arbitrator acts within his power under the FAA when he determines 
whether the parties agreed to class arbitration. Id. at 2071. This case allows arbitrators to authorize 
class actions in arbitration, so long as the authorization is based on the text of the contract. Id. at 2069. 
This means that companies will need to insert explicit class action bans in their arbitration agreements 
to ensure that an arbitrator interprets the contract to prohibit class actions in arbitration. Id. at 2069–71. 
A contract does not have to explicitly allow class actions for them to be permitted. Id. This ruling is 
not surprising given the Court’s consistent deference to arbitration decisions and arbitral power. 
 325. The notion of “contracting” is generous given that such arrangements are often take-it-or-
leave-it deals, where employees have no bargaining power. 
 326. See Klonoff, supra note 220, at 822–23 (“The combined effect of Concepcion and American 
Express is to deal a crippling blow to the adjudication of many kinds of small-claims cases.”). 
 327. Miller, supra note 8, at 322 (“The increased costs and heightened risk of noncertification 
inhibits the institution of potentially meritorious class cases, which often leaves public policies 
underenforced and large numbers of citizens uncompensated.”); see also Spencer, supra note 8, at 364 
(“Ultimately, a restrictive interpretation of class-certification standards tends to preclude classes from 
proceeding to a resolution of their claims on the merits.”). This obstructive federal class action 
jurisprudence is exacerbated post-CAFA, because “the vast majority of significant class actions [are] 
heard in federal court.” Klonoff, supra note 220, at 745; id. at n.91 (citing studies showing how CAFA 
shifted most class actions to federal court). 
 328. The trilogy includes: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (holding that the 
moving party need not support its summary judgment motion with evidence negating the opponent’s 
claim); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (holding that substantive 
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defendants to dispose of cases before a determination on the merits.
329
 The 
drafters of Rule 56
330
 intended for summary judgment to be a rare event—
reserved only for “simple issues where the facts are on the surface,”331 and 
where there is “no real defense on the facts.”332 Genuine issues were better 
left for jury trial.
333
 However, disposition of cases by summary judgment 
has become far more common.
334
 Unsurprisingly, this development has 
disproportionately hurt those alleging workplace and other forms of 
discrimination.
335
 The “prominent role” this procedural vehicle has played 
 
 
evidentiary standard at trial applies at summary judgment stage); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (imposing a plausibility standard to summary judgment 
context). 
 329. See D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on 
the Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 35–36 (1988) 
(analyzing “the new approach to summary judgment” following the Celotex trilogy and arguing that 
“many of the burdens flowing from recent changes in the system have fallen more heavily upon 
plaintiffs than defendants”). 
 Some scholars dispute whether the trilogy merely reflects a trend to dispose of cases under Rule 
56 that existed prior to 1986. See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment 
Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 862, 906 (2007) 
(questioning whether trilogy led to increased summary judgments); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing 
Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 620 (2004) (increased summary judgments started in 1970s); Why 
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra note 245, at 140 n.3 (comparing different views on the 
impact of the trilogy on reduction in trials). 
 330. Rule 56 states that summary judgment should be granted where “the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).  
 331. Clark, supra note 14, at 318. 
 332. Id. at 319. 
 333. Id. at 319 (in context of discussing role of summary judgment, drafter of the original Rules 
notes “in the case of a real dispute, there is no substitute anywhere for a trial”). 
 334. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 537 (“Federal trial judges are now more likely to grant 
summary judgment [post-trilogy.]”); Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1897, 1942 (1998) (“[J]udges will stretch to make summary judgment apply even in borderline cases 
which, a decade ago, might have been thought indisputably trial-worthy.”). 
 335. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 83, at 104, 128 & n.68 (concluding that “federal courts 
disfavor employment discrimination plaintiffs” and that “pretrial adjudication particularly disfavors 
employment discrimination plaintiffs” on the basis of five years of empirical data); Kevin M. Clermont 
& Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004) (examining governmental data and concluding that 
employment discrimination plaintiffs “win a lower proportion of cases during pretrial”); Burbank, 
supra note 329, at 622 (noting study on employment discrimination cases in Seventh Circuit and 
concluding that “some litigants. . . are not receiving reasonable opportunities to present their claims”); 
Cecil et al., supra note 329, at 886–89 & n.66 (noting the increase in summary judgment motions 
being granted against plaintiffs alleging civil rights violations and citing statistics showing that, with 
respect to “defendants’ motions in which the court took some action [in civil rights cases] . . . there are 
2.59 defendants’ motions granted in whole or in part for each defendant’s motion denied, compared 
with 1.33 motions in torts cases, 1.42 motions in contracts cases, and 1.45 motions in ‘other’ cases”); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates over Time, Across Case 
Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts 17–18 (Cornell 
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in this substantive area is “striking.”336 
Empirical studies bear this out: “Summary judgment motions by 
defendants are more common in [employment discrimination and civil 
rights] cases . . . are more likely to be granted . . . and more likely to 
terminate the litigation.”337 Comparing summary judgment grants across 
various substantive areas, the Federal Judicial Center found in a 2007 
study that in employment discrimination and civil rights cases, grants were 
the highest: 73% and 70% respectively.
338
 In a 2008 Federal Judicial 
Center study, the grants were even higher: 77% and 70% respectively.
339
 
By contrast, grants were 61% for torts and 59% for contracts cases.
340
 
Professor Joseph Seiner, in conjunction with the Federal Judicial Center, 
also conducted a 2006 study revealing that a plaintiff alleging employment 
discrimination had over an 80% chance of having his/her claim dismissed, 
in whole or in part, by summary judgment.
341
 The deleterious use of this 
 
 
Law Faculty Publications, Paper No. 108, 2008), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context=lsrp_papers (empirical study shows “[s]ummary judgment 
rates in employment discrimination and other civil rights cases are consistently higher than rates in 
contract and tort cases”).  
 336. Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael Baylson 
2–3 (Aug. 13, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Cecil Memorandum], available at https://bulk.resource.org/ 
courts.gov/fjc/sujulrs2.pdf; see also Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment 
Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 224–25 [hereinafter Oddball Iqbal and Twombly] (“While 
there may be debate on what constitutes a procedural revolution, the effect of summary judgment on 
employment discrimination appears to be such a revolution. Defendants move for summary judgment 
as a matter of course in this area.”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The 
Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 32 (2010) [hereinafter 
The New Summary Judgment Motion] (“Judges dismiss employment discrimination cases more often 
under motions for summary judgment than most other types of cases.”). 
 337. 2008 Cecil Memorandum, supra note 336, at 3. 
 338. Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Michael Baylson 6 
tbl.3, 9 tbl.4 (June 15, 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy06.pdf/ 
$file/sujufy06.pdf. 
 339. 2008 Cecil Memorandum, supra note 336, at 9 tbl.4. 
 340. Id. Additional measures bear out the same trend. For employment discrimination and civil 
rights cases, at least one summary judgment motion was granted, in whole or in part, at a 20% and 
10% rate respectively. Id. at 16 tbl.11. In contrast, for torts and contracts, the rates were 5% and 6% 
respectively. Id. For employment discrimination and civil rights cases, they were terminated by 
summary judgment at a 15% and 6% rate. Id. at 17 tbl.12. In contrast, for torts and contracts, the rates 
were 3% and 4% respectively. Id. 
 341. Seiner, supra note 123, at 1033 tbl.C. Summary judgment dismissals of employment 
discrimination cases may be even higher in specific federal jurisdictions. For example, in a study 
conducted by a law firm in Atlanta of employment discrimination cases in the Northern District of 
Georgia in 2011 and 2012, such cases were dismissed, in whole or part, at a 95% respectively. See 
AMANDA FARAHANY & TANYA MCADAMS, BARRETT & FARAHANY, LLP, ANALYSIS OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS FOR CASES IN WHICH AN ORDER WAS ISSUED ON 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 2011 AND 2012 IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 3 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326697. 
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procedure to dismiss cases alleging race, national origin, gender, 
disability, and age employment discrimination has been well 
documented.
342
 
The disproportionate summary disposition of workplace discrimination 
and other civil rights cases has been prompted by familiar forces—
Supreme Court jurisprudence, docket pressures
343
 and judicial bias.
344
 As 
with pleadings and class certification, summary judgment gives a district 
judge significant discretion to make or break a case.
345
 Once again, this 
power renders plaintiffs more vulnerable to the personal predilections of 
judges,
346
 who are generally less diverse and more sheltered than juries.
347
 
This was seen quite poignantly in Scott v. Harris,
348
 where the Supreme 
Court ironically came to the non-unanimous conclusion that there was no 
 
 
 342. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 550 & nn.156–61 (citing articles documenting “the special 
use of summary judgment to dismiss sexual harassment and hostile work environment cases, race and 
national origin discrimination cases, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cases, age-discrimination 
cases, and prison-inmate cases”); Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, supra note 336, at 32 (“In the 1990s, several articles discussed the 
specific effect of summary judgment on the dismissal of employment discrimination cases.”); Thomas, 
Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra note 245, at 141 n.5 (citing articles contending that 
summary judgment is misused in cases involving hostile environment, the ADA, and Title VII claims); 
see, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 71 (1999) (arguing “that federal courts are misusing summary judgment in 
hostile environment cases brought under Title VII”); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities 
Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101 (1999) (explaining how summary 
judgment is misused in favor of defendants in ADA cases); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and 
the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. 
L. REV. 203 (1993) (explaining how summary judgment is misused in Title VII and ADEA cases); 
Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 
895–96 (2006) (finding that “courts treat certain types of employment discrimination cases differently” 
and that race and age employment discrimination cases are more likely to be dismissed under summary 
judgment); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709–11 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is granted more 
often in sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims based on gender); see generally, 
Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG. 79, 89–90 (2006) 
(explaining how production burden works against plaintiffs generally, including in summary 
judgment). 
 343. See Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) 
(citations omitted) (“The expanding federal caseload has contributed to a drift in many areas of federal 
litigation toward substituting summary judgment for trial. The drift is understandable, given caseload 
pressures . . . .”). 
 344. Schneider, supra note 9, at 542–43, 545. 
 345. Id. at 542, 539 (describing summary judgment as “do or die” moment for plaintiffs). 
 346. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 342, at 714–15 (explaining how summary judgment can 
“permit[] subtle bias to go unchecked” in gender discrimination cases). 
 347. Schneider, supra note 9, at 542–43 & n.126; see, e.g., Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 
342 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Whatever the early life of a federal judge, she or he usually lives in a narrow 
segment of the enormously broad American socio-economic spectrum, generally lacking the current 
real-life experience required in interpreting subtle sexual dynamics of the workplace . . . .”). 
 348. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
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genuine issue of disputed fact over whether a police officer used excessive 
force in a high-speed chase, in violation of a motorist’s constitutional civil 
rights.
349
 Overturning both the district court and appellate court’s denial of 
summary judgment for the defendant, the Court concluded that no 
reasonable jury could have found for the plaintiff.
350
 The irony that judges 
on both of the lower courts and one justice on the Supreme Court took the 
opposite position did not escape legal critics.
351
 
As Professor Elizabeth M. Schneider explains, this procedural barrier’s 
impact has been to under-enforce workplace discrimination and other civil 
rights laws, to render invisible attendant legal and personal harms, and to 
impede the law’s development.352 Although Rule 56’s language is facially 
“neutral,” its impact has been skewed against those purportedly harmed by 
discriminatory practices. 
A related potential disproportionate procedural harm to workplace 
discrimination and civil rights claims is court treatment of expert 
testimony and other evidence. The admissibility of expert evidence, 
governed by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
353
 is 
conditioned on such evidence being reliable and relevant.
354
 Professor 
Elizabeth M. Schneider describes how the need for social science experts 
in cases involving stereotyping and cognitive bias make them particularly 
vulnerable to an increasingly tighter admissibility standard.
355
 As the 
Daubert standard is applied more stringently and broadly, employment 
discrimination and civil rights cases at summary judgment, class 
certification, and trial may be at greater risk of dismissal.
356
 
 
 
 349. Id. at 386. 
 350. Id. at 375–76, 379–80, 386. 
 351. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 547–48; Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald 
Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 894–97 (2009). Justice Stevens himself recognized the 
contradiction. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 389–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 352. Schneider, supra note 9, at 543, 551, 556. 
 353. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) 
(establishing that the Daubert requirement applies to all expert testimony rather than just to 
“scientific” testimony); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1997) (holding that the 
abuse of discretion standard of review applies to a district court’s decision to exclude expert evidence). 
 354. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
 355. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 552–55 (“Since expert testimony is now widely used in civil 
rights and employment discrimination cases, there is good reason to believe that the lethal combination 
of Daubert and summary judgment has affected these cases as well.”); see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (“The District Court 
concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at the certification stage of class-action 
proceedings. We doubt that is so, but even if properly considered, [the expert’s] testimony does 
nothing to advance respondents’ case.”). 
 356. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 552–56. 
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2. Sanctions 
The history of Rule 11 reveals that it has been more harmful to 
employment discrimination and civil rights claimants and their counsel 
than others. In 1983, Rule 11 was amended to make sanctions mandatory 
and to eradicate the “good faith” defense available to support a 
questionable pleading.
357
 Under this amended version of the Rule, studies 
revealed that plaintiffs and their counsel were far more likely to be the 
target of a Rule 11 sanctions motion and far more likely to be sanctioned 
under the Rule than defendants and their counsel.
358
 Civil rights plaintiffs 
and their lawyers, in particular, were sanctioned more often.
359
 Similar to 
the debate over pleadings’ disparate impact, empirical studies differed 
over the disparate impact of rule-based sanctions.
360
 Following a 
 
 
 357. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Public Policy: The 
Use and Impact of Rule 11, Public Policy, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943, 946-49, 956 (1992). 
 358. Lawrence C. Marshall, Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Public Policy: The Use 
and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943, 953 & 954 tbl.2 (1992) (finding that “the plaintiff’s 
side was the target of sanctions in 70.3% of the cases in which sanctions were imposed” compared 
with 28.4% for defendants and 1.3% for both and that, “[w]ith regard to formal Rule 11 activity not 
leading to sanctions, the plaintiff’s side was the target in 57.6% of the cases in which such activity 
occurred” compared with 34.7% for defendants and 7.7% for both); Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Thomas E. 
Willging & Donna Stienstra, The Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Rule 11, 2 FJC DIRECTIONS 3, 3 
(1991) (“Rule 11 sanctions are sought more frequently against plaintiffs than defendants” and 
“[m]otions for sanctions against the plaintiff are more likely to be granted than those against the 
defendant”) See also Hart, supra note 53, at 13–15 (study of federal district court judges conducted by 
the Federal Judicial Center in 1990 “concluded that sanctions were sought more often against plaintiffs 
than defendants and that motions for sanctions against plaintiffs were more likely to be granted than 
those against defendants . . . . Like the FJC study, the [American Judicature Society] study [of 
attorneys] also found that plaintiffs and their counsel were the target of Rule 11 sanction activity to a 
far greater extent than defendants and their counsel.”); Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 855, 870 (1992) (noting the likelihood that Rule 11 has worked against plaintiffs). 
 359. Spencer, supra note 8, at 360 (“[I]t is by now commonly felt that prior to the amendment to 
its current form in the early 1990s, Rule 11 was disproportionately used to sanction plaintiffs’ counsel 
in civil rights actions.”); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988) 
(“Rule 11 is being used disproportionately against plaintiffs, particularly in certain types of litigation 
such as civil rights [and] employment discrimination . . . .”); Hart, supra note 53, at 12–13 (“The early 
studies found that plaintiffs were sanctioned much more frequently than defendants, particularly in 
civil rights cases.”); see, e.g., id. at 15 (noting the 1992 American Judicature Society study of attorneys 
“concluded that civil rights cases were disproportionately impacted by Rule 11”); Stephen B. Burbank, 
The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 
1938 (1989) (noting that in the Third Circuit in a one year period from 1987 to 1988, “Rule 11 had a 
disproportionately adverse impact on civil rights plaintiffs, in that civil rights plaintiffs, their lawyers, 
or both were sanctioned at a rate (47.1%) far higher than the rate for plaintiffs as a whole (15.9%), and 
higher still than the rate for plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases (8.45%)”). 
 360. The results of empirical studies were not uniform. On the one hand, the American 
Juridicature Society’s study concluded that when “lawyers were asked to report the effects Rule 11 has 
had on their practices . . . [o]nly in the area of civil rights did the results clearly differ by side 
represented. In that category, plaintiffs’ lawyers’ behavior was affected much more than their 
opponents’ conduct.” Marshall et al., supra note 358, at 946. Moreover, “[a]lthough civil rights cases 
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groundswell of protest, the Rule was ultimately amended in 1993 to give 
judges more discretion when meting out sanctions.
361
 Even this discretion, 
however, can be exploited in a climate of increasing hostility to civil rights 
claims.
362
 
3. Discovery 
Finally, the scope of discovery—one of the cornerstones of the 
adjudicative process—has steadily eroded since the Rules’ inception. 
Initially designed to favor fishing expeditions
363
 over litigation by 
 
 
made up 11.4% of federal cases filed, our survey shows that 22.7% of the cases in which sanctions had 
been imposed were civil rights cases.” Id. at 965–66 & tbl.9. In contrast, “contracts cases represent 
23.0% of cases filed but account for only 15.9% of sanctions; personal injury cases constitute 19.2% of 
cases but account for only 15.1% of sanctions. In this regard, our evidence tends to confirm the 
commentary about Rule 11’s disproportionate impact on civil rights cases.” Id. When “compar[ing] 
civil rights cases with a category that groups together the contracts and ‘other commercial’ categories 
. . . the commercial and contracts category represents 32.8% of cases filed and accounts for 34.6% of 
the sanctions, a ratio that makes civil rights cases (11.4% of cases; 22.7% of sanctions) stand out as the 
type of case most prone to the imposition of sanctions.” Id. at 968. The authors noted that “the 
prevalence of sanctions in civil rights cases might relate as much to the complexity of the law in that 
area as to any ideological predisposition that makes judges more prone to impose sanctions in civil 
rights cases.” Id. at 967. 
 On the other hand, the FJC’s study concluded that “[t]he imposition rate of sanctions in civil 
rights cases was not out of line with that in other types of cases” and that “Rule 11 has not been 
applied disproportionately against represented plaintiffs or their attorneys in civil rights cases, nor has 
it been applied to reasonable arguments advanced by plaintiffs’ attorneys in civil rights cases.” 
Wiggins, Willging & Stienstra, supra note 358, at 4. See also Hart, supra note 53, at 13–15 (explaining 
1990 Federal Judicial Center study of federal district court judges concluded that “civil rights plaintiffs 
were not disproportionately impacted by Rule 11”). 
 361. The 1993 revision was “intended to remedy problems that have arisen in the interpretation 
and application of the 1983 revision of the rule.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes (1993). 
Specifically, “[t]he revision broadens the scope of” the attorney’s “obligation to the court to refrain 
from conduct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1 . . . but places greater constraints on the imposition of 
sanctions and should reduce the number of motions for sanctions presented to the court.” Id.. Compare 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1992) with FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.03 (3d ed. 2009) (“The 1993 amendments . . . clarified and liberalized the 
standard for complying with Rule 11.”). 
 362. For example, even after the 1993 amendment of Rule 11, civil rights claimants and their 
counsel may still be chilled from bringing such “disfavored” claims. See Hart, supra note 53, at 104–
09 (arguing that “the 1993 amendments have not been successful in reducing Rule 11’s chilling effects 
[on civil rights cases] primarily because many of the causes of the chilling effects continue to exist in 
practice”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or Bane?, 40 
ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 994 (1998) (arguing that the 1983 and 1993 Rule 11 amendments erect greater 
procedural hurdles and risks); see also Yamamoto, supra note 42, at 397 (“A rule structured to deter 
all frivolous filings may be neutral by its terms and nevertheless partial in its effects. Certain types of 
potential litigants may be more severely impacted because their social situation generates 
disproportionate numbers of claims deemed frivolous by current norms.”). 
 363. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be 
accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ 
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ambush,
364
 this stage of the adjudicative cycle has been reigned in over the 
last three decades.
365
 In an effort to curtail costs and abuse, the discovery 
rules have understandably grown restrictive over time,
366
 as illustrated by a 
few examples. This trend started with the 1983 amendments to Rule 26, 
explicitly recognizing the limits of discovery
367
 and requiring judges to 
exercise their discretion to ensure that discovery was subject to an 
appropriate cost-benefit proportionality analysis.
368
 A decade later, the 
discovery rules underwent further retraction with limitations put on the 
number and duration of depositions
369
 and the number of interrogatories.
370
 
In 2000, Rule 26 was revised to cut the scope of discovery even further.
371
 
Electronic discovery rules were created in 2006 that enable producing 
parties to withhold information under certain circumstances and share 
costs when particularly burdensome.
372
 More recently, the Advisory 
 
 
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.”); Spencer, 
supra note 8, at 365 (“‘[F]ishing expeditions’ were allowed under the discovery rules.”).  
 364. See Clark, supra note 14, at 318 (describing discovery rules as vehicle for preventing surprise 
at trial and as “fairer, and more productive of truth in ultimate analysis”). 
 365. Miller, supra note 37, at 52 (“For a quarter century, successive amendments to the Federal 
Rules had impressed limits on the extent of discovery, established mandatory disclosure, and narrowed 
the scope of what matters could be inquired into under the discovery rules.”). 
 366. See Miller, supra note 8, at 353 (noting “series of periodic amendments” to the discovery 
rules over twenty-five years designed to “reduce the density and the cost of discovery”); see also id. at 
354. 
 367. Rule 26 was changed in 1983 to no longer include, “Unless the court orders otherwise . . . , 
the frequency of use of these [discovery] methods is not limited.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), 97 F.R.D. 165, 
214 (1983). 
 368. See Miller, supra note 8, at 353–54. Rule 26 reflected this priority by directing judges to 
ensure discovery was not “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or . . . obtain[able] from some 
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(C)(i). This is also referred to as proportionality. See generally, 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (3d ed. 
2010) (explaining discovery proportionality). 
 369. Rule 30 was changed in 1993 from allowing a party to take thirty depositions to ten without 
leave of court. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (1992) with FED. R. CIV. P. 30. 
 370. Rule 33 was changed in 1993 from allowing a party to propound an indeterminate number of 
interrogatories to twenty-five. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (1992) with FED. R. CIV. P. 33. 
 371. Rule 26(b)(1) was changed in 2000 from limiting the scope of discovery to the “subject 
matter” of the litigation to material “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Compare FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(b)(1) (1999) with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). The 2000 amendment permits a court to “order 
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter” only upon a showing of “good cause.” See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). See also WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 368, § 2008 (describing impact 
of 2000 rule amendment). 
 372. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored 
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom 
discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (“[S]ome sources of electronically 
stored information can be accessed only with substantial burden and cost. In a particular case, these 
burdens and costs may make the information on such sources not reasonably accessible.”). 
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Committee proposed extensive changes to the discovery rules: shifting 
proportionality to a more prominent status;
373
 eliminating the forms;
374
 and 
cutting back the number and duration of depositions, the number of 
interrogatories, and the number of requests for admissions.
375
 
Unquestionably, there has been significant debate over the appropriate 
breadth and depth of discovery.
376
 Evidence of this ongoing debate is most 
 
 
 Rules 26(f), 33(d), 34, and 37(e) were changed in 2006 to take into account electronic discovery. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C) (“A discovery plan must state the parties’ views and proposals on . . . any 
issues about disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or forms 
in which it should be produced.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d) (allowing parties to produce business records 
in response to interrogatories “[i]f the answer to an interrogatory may be determined by examining, 
auditing, compiling, abstracting, or summarizing a party’s business records (including electronically 
stored information)”); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A) (allowing parties to request “any designated 
documents or electronically stored information”); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C) (permitting the 
requesting party to “specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be 
produced”); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D) (permitting parties to object “to a requested form for 
producing electronically stored information”); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E) (establishing requirements 
for producing electronically stored information and stating that “[i]f a request does not specify a form 
for producing electronically stored information, a party must produce it in a form or forms in which it 
is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms; and . . . [a] party need not produce 
the same electronically stored information in more than one form”); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (“Absent 
exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to 
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an 
electronic information system.”). See WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 368, at § 2003.1 
(describing amendments); 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2051.1 (3d ed. 2010) (describing amendments); 8B CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§§ 2178, 2218–19, 2284.1 (3d ed. 2010) (describing amendments). 
 373. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: REQUEST FOR COMMENT 289 (2013), available at http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/ 
files/2013/11/Published-Rules-Package-Civil-Rules-Only.pdf [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT] 
(adding language to require that discovery is “proportional to the needs of the case, considering the 
amount in controversy, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the discovery in resolving issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). See also Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, 
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 260 (2013), in Preliminary Draft, supra. [hereinafter Campbell Memorandum]; Notice of 
Hearings of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committees on Rules of Bankruptcy and Civil 
Procedure, 78 Fed. Reg. 49768-01 (Aug. 15 2013). 
 374. Campbell Memorandum, supra note 373, at 260, 275–76 (“Part I.C. presents for action a 
recommendation to approve for publication a proposal that would abrogate Rule 84 and the Rule 84 
official forms.”); see also PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 373, at 329 (abrogating Rule 84). 
 375. Campbell Memorandum, supra note 373, at 267 (proposing “presumptive numerical limits” 
on several forms of discovery); PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 373, at 300–01 (reducing the number 
of depositions from ten to five and reducing the duration of each deposition from one day of seven 
hours to one day of six hours); id. at 305 (reducing the number of interrogatories from twenty five to 
fifteen); id. at 310 (adding section 36(a)(2), which states that “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered 
by the court, a party may serve no more than 25 requests to admit”).  
 376. An extensive examination of this is beyond the scope of this Article. See Miller, supra note 8, 
at 356 (“Debates about the positives and negatives of wide-angle discovery have gone on for 
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recently illustrated by the avalanche of comments and testimony proffered 
in response to the Advisory Committee’s latest discovery proposals.377 
This latest round of procedural contention also illustrates the familiar 
divide and high stakes of procedural reform. This is not a neutral 
enterprise. Not surprisingly, efforts to constrain discovery and control 
costs have worked to the detriment of plaintiffs and prevented their claims 
from being resolved on the merits.
378
 And concerns over the magnitude 
and pervasiveness of expensive discovery
379
 have proven to be 
overblown.
380
 Even so, the Advisory Committee’s recent proposed 
 
 
decades—often with great intensity—and they undoubtedly will continue . . . .”). 
 377. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (2343 comments on proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, most in opposition to the limits imposed by the proposed changes); see also infra note 380. 
 378. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 364–65. See also Jeffrey Stemple, Politics and Sociology in 
Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 605–06 (“Reduced scope may, 
depending on how judges construe the [then] new standard, bar plaintiffs from using larger defendant 
workforce and employment practices data to bolster circumstantial evidence of discrimination.”); id. at 
603 (“A more sustained look at how claim-or-defense relevancy might work in particular cases 
suggests that [then] Proposed Amended Rule 26(b)(1) will indeed be likely to favor defendants, 
particularly in cases involving discrimination, product liability, and environmental protection . . . .”). 
 379. There has been significant criticism from the bench, bar, and scholars of the scope, burdens, 
costs, and abuse of discovery. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) 
(expressing concern over how expensive discovery can be in massive antitrust case); ACF Indus., Inc. 
v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1086 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he widespread abuse of discovery 
. . . is a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation.”); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic 
Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1161–62 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev’d, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (observing 
how parties use discovery to coerce opposition into settlement and criticizing “predatory discovery”); 
ABA SECTION OF LITIG., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY 
ABUSE, 1 (1977) (describing “discovery abuse”); William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference 
Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 
(1978) (“Unnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high costs to the litigants, and 
correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as a lever toward settlement have come to be part 
of some lawyers’ trial strategy.”); see infra note 406. 
 380. See Miller, supra note 8, at 355 (“[D]iscovery usually works well, is quite limited in most 
cases . . . and its burdensomeness poses problems in a relatively thin band of complex and ‘big’ 
cases.”); Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. 
L. REV. 683, 684–85 (1998) (studies indicate that one third to one half of cases do not involve any 
discovery); ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORTER’S MEMORANDUM REGARDING DUKE 
CONFERENCE SUBCOMMITTEE RULES PACKAGE 83 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2013-04.pdf (“In most cases discovery 
now, as it was then [1983], is accomplished in reasonable proportion to the realistic needs of the case. 
This conclusion has been established by repeated empirical studies, including the large-scale closed-
case study done by the Federal Judicial Center for the Duke Conference.”); see also EMERY G. LEE III 
& THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVERY: 
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, 28 
(2009), available at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf; Alexander 
Dimitrief et al., Update on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 211, 217–18 
(2010) (statement of Emory G. Lee). The Advisory Committee’s latest proposals are designed to 
address a proportionality problem that admittedly exists in only a small subset of cases, but would be 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
518 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:455 
 
 
 
 
discovery amendments continued along the familiar restrictive course 
charted.
381
 
As a number of scholars—myself included—have warned, a course 
correction is in order because of the potential danger the proposed rules 
pose for cases involving employment discrimination and civil rights.
382
 
III. RE-LEGITIMIZING TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY 
In sum, as scholars take the time to commemorate the seventy-fifth 
anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a sobering conclusion 
is inescapable. The trans-substantive nature of the civil litigation process 
has resulted in a troubling trend away from court access and merit-based 
resolutions for workplace and civil rights claims. The application and 
 
 
applied to all substantive areas. Relying on such atypical cases to make sweeping, systemic reforms to 
all cases risks making bad law. Letter from Suja A. Thomas, Professor, University of Illinois College 
of Law, to Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules & Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 3–5 (Feb. 13, 
2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-
1185 (“Legal change should not occur where atypical cases motivate legal change and the change 
affects typical cases. This can create bad law.”); see also Suja A. Thomas, How Atypical, Hard Cases 
Make Bad Law (See, e.g., The Lack of Judicial Restraint in Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Ricci), 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 989, 1006–08 (2013) (arguing that the atypical facts of Twombly, including the high 
cost of discovery to be borne primarily by defendants, resulted in a change in the law that now affects 
cases with more typical facts); Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 
supra note 336. 
 Professor Arthur R. Miller, who served as the Reporter to the Advisory Committee at the time of 
the 1983 discovery amendments, concedes that he and the Advisory Committee were swayed more by 
impressions than data, and influenced largely by a narrow range of cases and comments. Miller, supra 
note 8, at 353–55. 
 381. This article went to publication prior to the Advisory Committee’s approval of the final 
version of the proposed amendments, which adopted some recommendations and withdrew others.  
 382. See generally Changing the Rules: Will Limiting the Scope of Civil Discovery Diminish 
Accountability and Leave Americans Without Access to Justice?: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary 
Comm., Subcomm. on Bankruptcy and the Courts, 113th Cong. 2 (Nov. 5, 2013) (statement of Arthur 
R. Miller, Professor, New York University); Changing the Rules: Will Limiting the Scope of Civil 
Discovery Diminish Accountability and Leave Americans Without Access to Justice?: Hearing Before 
the Senate Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Bankruptcy and the Courts, 113th Cong. 10 (Nov. 5, 2013) 
(statement of Sherrilyn Ifill, President, NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund); Letter from Stephen 
Burbank, Professor, University of Penn. Law School, to Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 
(Feb. 10, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-
2013-0002-0729; Letter from Helen Hershkoff et al., to Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 
(Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-
0002-0622; Letter from Suzette M. Malveaux, Professor, Columbus School of Law, Catholic 
University of America, to Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Feb. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-1650; Statement of 
Arthur R. Miller, Professor, New York University, to Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Jan. 
9, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-
0386; Letter from Beth Thornburg, Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law, to Comm. on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure (Jan. 31, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail; 
D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0499. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/8
  
 
 
 
 
2014] A DIAMOND IN THE ROUGH 519 
 
 
 
 
interpretation of the Rules, and sometimes the Rules themselves,
383
 have 
disproportionately damaged those most in need of society’s institutional 
protection to the point where the legitimacy of rule trans-substantivity 
should be revisited. A paradigm that systematically excludes significant 
swaths of its population—particularly the disenfranchised384—from its 
administration of justice is ultimately a threat to democracy.
385
 
 Re-legitimizing a trans-substantive rule system may require a multi-
faceted approach, drawing upon various stakeholders to participate in 
ameliorating a flawed system. This Article introduces some initial ideas 
for charting a course back to a more democratic civil litigation system. 
A. Judicial Realignment with the Rules’ Underlying Principles 
Given the Supreme Court’s seminal role in requiring victims of 
discrimination to scale ever higher walls to reach a more exclusive and 
elusive forum for justice, this is where change must begin. Jurisprudential 
realignment with the values and purposes behind the Rules would set in 
motion robust participation in a civil litigation process committed to 
substantive rights. Through interpretation of neutral text, Supreme Court 
precedent would reflect back principles consistent with the history and 
purpose of the Rules. Interpretations that don’t violate the spirit or the 
letter of the Rules would incentivize the lower courts to apply the Rules in 
harmony with the drafters’ intent. 
A realignment would emanate the core values and objectives made 
plain by the Rules’ founders. The drafters of the Federal Rules eschewed 
form over substance.
386
 From their inception, the Rules were subordinate 
to substantive law.
387
 Gamesmanship was disfavored,
388
 and court access 
and merit-based resolutions were prioritized.
389
 The Rules’ originators 
 
 
 383. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 369 (describing restrictive impulses in rulemaking for Rules 16, 
11 and 56). 
 384. Matthew 25:40 (New Revised Standard Version) (“And the king will answer them, ‘Truly I 
tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to 
me.’”).  
 385. See Yamamoto, supra note 42, at 345 (“Reforms that discourage court access for minorities 
asserting ‘marginal’ rights claims reflect value judgments about the purposes of adjudication and the 
desirability of broad-based participation in the litigation process.”). 
 386. Clark, supra note 14, at 297–300. 
 387. Id. at 297, 299. 
 388. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts 
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation”). 
 389. Clark, supra note 13, at 518–19. 
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emphasized neutrality and fairness through uniform treatment
390—a formal 
equality model. Process was the gateway to justice and the embodiment of 
democracy. Prior to the Rules, the inflexibility and rigidity of the common 
law system required plaintiffs to conform their claims to recognized forms 
or writs, which often left them without remedy and shut out of the 
adjudicatory system altogether.
391
 Consequently, common law was 
replaced with an equity-based system.
392
 This merger of law and equity 
resulted in a simpler, less rigid, more accessible route to the civil litigation 
system.
393
 
Moreover, procedure not only had to be impartial, but also have the 
appearance of impartiality.
394
 The drafters’ attention to public perception 
reveals the centrality of it to a successful dispute resolution scheme. 
Process merely perceived as illegitimate made it so. Without this 
imprimatur, procedure lacked validity. 
In enacting the Federal Rules, the original rule-makers also sought to 
balance two arguably competing objectives: removing artificial barriers to 
dispute resolution on the merits; and protecting courts’ administrative 
prerogatives.
395
 The Rules were designed to promote citizen access to 
justice, while allowing for the orderly and efficient administration of the 
civil litigation system.
396
 This dual intention is reflected in the text of Rule 
1 itself, which states that the Rules should be “construed and administered 
 
 
 390. Clark, supra note 14, at 299 (“Regular procedure is necessary to secure equal treatment for 
all; it is necessary, too, for the quite as important factor of the appearance of equal treatment for all.”). 
 391. Id. at 308–10. 
 392. Id. at 309–10. The Rules drafters concluded: 
When the historic reasons for division [between law and equity] had for several centuries 
ceased to have point, there seemed, as there was, no reason for penalizing suitors for having 
come to the wrong court, or having come to the right court in the wrong way. And so the code 
reform caused the abolition of the forms of action, the union of law and equity, and the use of 
the one form of action for all civil causes. 
Id. at 310. 
 393. Id. at 308–10, 319–20. See also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982 (1987) 
(arguing that equity is responsible for the prioritization of access). 
 394. Clark, supra note 14, at 299 (“Regular procedure . . . is necessary . . . for the quite as 
important factor of the appearance of equal treatment for all.”); see also id. at 299–300. 
 395. See id. at 300 (internal quotations omitted) (“One of the most difficult and one of the most 
permanent problems which a legal system must face is a combination of a due regard for the claims of 
substantial justice with a system of procedure rigid enough to be workable.”). 
 396. Although the Rules were meant to ease the burden of entry, they remain standardized codes 
of conduct, tempered by judicial discretion. Spencer, supra note 8, at 366 (“[T]here are two sides to 
civil procedure. The first is access-promoting and favors resolution of disputes on the merits. The other 
is more restrictive and cost-conscious, creating various doctrines that frustrate the assertion and 
prosecution of potentially meritorious claims.”). 
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to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.”397 
The primacy of court access and merits-based resolutions is reflected in 
the Rules themselves and in their interaction with one another. 
Simplified
398
 and permissive
399
 notice pleading, robust discovery,
400
 liberal 
amendments
401
 and generous aggregation
402
 worked symbiotically to give 
litigants access to the civil justice system and the underlying evidence in 
their cases.
403
 Litigants were further protected by rules that made 
dispositive motions rare,
404
 irrational outcomes impotent,
405
 and judicial 
 
 
 397. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
 398. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“The liberal notice pleading of 
Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on 
the merits of a claim.”); Spencer, supra note 8, at 354 (“[P]romoting the vision of open access 
espoused by the drafters was the introduction of simplified ‘notice pleading,’ which was designed to 
minimize greatly the number of cases dismissed on the pleadings.”); Yamamoto, supra note 42, at 
356–57 (the move to notice pleading from “archaic fact-pleading [meant m]ore people with legal 
grievances could gain entry into the system”); see FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 399. Professor A. Benjamin Spencer correctly notes how Rule 11 reflects a commitment to access 
and the liberal pleading regime originally established in Rule 8: 
[T]he current post-1993 version of Rule 11—with its safe-harbor provision, emphasis on 
deterrence, and allowance for innovative legal arguments—was meant to complement 
simplified pleading by ensuring truthful allegations without deterring litigants from asserting 
what some may view as tenuous claims. 
Spencer, supra note 8, at 354–55. 
 400. See id. at 355 (“The innovation of modern discovery ushered in by the rules further promoted 
access by enabling plaintiffs to initiate their claims without having to have full and complete 
information.”); Stemple, supra note 378, at 535–36 (“‘Fishing expeditions’ were to be allowed in the 
interests of developing facts in a relatively efficient way so that legal disputes could be determined in 
light of maximum factual information.”); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The 
Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 697–700 (1998); 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (relating to discovery). 
 401. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 356 (“Liberal amendment rules permit parties to cure errors or 
omissions by amending their pleadings to add claims, defenses, or parties as necessary.”); see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (courts “should freely give leave [to amend pleadings] when justice so 
requires”).  
 402. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 355 (“Liberal joinder rules, as well as the class-action device, 
have promoted access by enabling parties with substantially related claims to prosecute together claims 
that they might otherwise have been unavailable to sustain individually.”); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407(a) (2006) (multidistrict litigation statute); FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (party joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) 
(permissive intervention);; FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (consolidation of actions).  
 403. See Burbank, supra note 329, at 603 (“Rule 56 was intended to function as an equilibrating 
device that would discipline the results of notice pleading and profit from those of broad discovery.”). 
 404. Clark, supra note 14, at 318–19; Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 
supra note 245, at 173; McGinley, supra note 342, at 230–32 (prior to Celotex trilogy, lower courts 
were hesitant to grant defendants summary judgment in federal discrimination suits because plaintiffs 
more easily made out a prima facie case). See also Spencer, supra note 8, at 356 (footnote omitted) 
(“The disinclination of courts toward default judgments further indicates the preference for merits-
based judgments over those obtained through procedural technicalities.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
60(b) (allowing judge to set aside default judgment entered under Rule 55).  
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discretion
406
 readily available to funnel cases to trial when necessary. 
This trek from the courthouse door to trial, however, has always been 
tempered by rules that discourage unnecessary costs,
407
 delay,
408
 and 
inefficiencies.
409
 Access is not unlimited. To be sure, this system of rules 
embodies serious trade-offs.
410
 Due process and democracy undergird the 
promise of a litigant’s “day in court” and an opportunity to vindicate her 
rights before a jury of her peers. But pragmatism checks any expectation 
of unfettered entree. Federal courts overwhelmed by bourgeoning dockets 
and limited resources are served well by rules that rein in costs, keep cases 
moving, and encourage efficiencies. 
Striking the proper balance between the dueling goals of justice and 
efficiency has been the sine qua non of the civil justice system. Since the 
Rules’ inception, and especially over the last quarter century, the 
 
 
 405. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 356 (footnotes omitted) (“The motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, the motion for new trial, and the motion for relief from judgment each provide litigants with an 
opportunity to seek a just, accurate resolution of their cause where the conclusion of the jury seems 
clearly inconsistent with the truth.”); see FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (judgment as a matter of law); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 59 (new trial); FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (relief from judgment). 
 406. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 356 (“Judicial discretion is rooted in the concern that disputes 
be resolved on their merits rather than procedural technicalities, resulting in a group of civil rules that 
permit judges to exercise significant discretion in the interest of justice.”). 
 407. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“On motion or on its own, the court must limit the 
frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules . . . if it determines that . . . the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) 
(making cost-sharing available in electronic discovery context). 
 408. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii). 
 409. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 357–58 (giving examples). For example, the rules governing 
joinder of claims and parties and supplemental jurisdiction promote efficiency by permitting those 
with similar claims to resolve them collectively. Id.; see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 
U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (“Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope 
of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly 
encouraged.”); Michelle S. Simon, Defining the Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367: A Hearty Welcome to Permissive Counterclaims, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 295, 298 (2005) 
(“[S]upplemental jurisdiction promotes fairness and judicial economy, and complements the liberal 
joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) 
(supplemental jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (multidistrict litigation statute); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim); FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (party joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class 
actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (permissive intervention); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (consolidation of 
actions). A more modern example is the initial disclosures rule, which was enacted in 1993 to save 
litigants the cost and time involved in seeking basic information from their opposition. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (initial disclosures). 
 410. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 8, at 365 n.71 (“Although the cost concerns associated with the 
production of inaccessible electronically stored information are valid, the question is whether a rule 
that presumptively protects such information against production will have an unfair adverse impact on 
litigants’ access to the information they need to make their case.”). 
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pendulum has swung from a “liberal ethos”411 of procedure to a 
“restrictive” one, resulting in a “deformation of federal procedure.”412 
Fueled by the increase in public rights litigation of the 1960s, especially 
class actions, many have sought—through procedural reform—to squelch 
what they perceived as an explosion of “frivolous” litigation, discovery 
abuse that extorted settlements, and other unscrupulous conduct.
413
 This 
backlash or “counterrevolution”414 has disproportionately harmed those 
challenging discriminatory employment practices and other civil rights. 
The courts have been at the epicenter of this devolution, often leading the 
way. So too can the courts—and most importantly the Supreme Court—
chart a course more faithful to the Rules’ history and guiding principles. 
Admittedly, determining a normative prescription for a rule system that 
toggles between unfettered participation and maximum efficiency is 
difficult. Such a prescription begs the question of what side the civil 
litigation should err: toward greatest inclusion or complete efficiency? The 
choice sets up a false dichotomy. Nonetheless, given the challenges of a 
civil litigation system in a pluralistic society
415
 subjected to limited 
regulation,
416
 there must be some give. 
Professor Eric K. Yamamoto observes, “From a utilitarian perspective, 
some indignity suffered by a minority of the populace [those denied court 
access] is an unavoidable and tolerable result of system shrinkage in the 
interest of efficiency.”417 Utilitarianism would suggest that some disparate 
impact of the Rules on a minority of claims and claimants is inevitable and 
 
 
 411. See Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 587, 587–88 (2011) (“When the Federal 
Rules were promulgated—that was in 1938, over 70 years ago—they had a very liberal ethos to 
them.”); Marcus, supra note 35, at 439 (“Dean Clark and the other drafters of the Federal Rules set out 
to devise a procedural system that would install what may be labeled the ‘liberal ethos,’ in which the 
preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery.”). 
 412. Professor Arthur R. Miller persuasively makes this point in Miller, supra note 8, at 357–71. 
 413. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 359 & n.35–38, 364. 
 414. Id. at 359; Risinger, supra note 329, at 35 (observing consensus view that there is a 
“counterrevolution” in civil procedure). 
 415. In a society so diverse, there are inevitable clashes. See Miller, supra note 8, at 361 
(emphasis added) (“In the main, most assertions of abusive behavior or frivolous lawsuits are 
anecdotal and subjective. Abuse and frivolity simply lie in the eye of the beholder.”). 
 416. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 387, 396 (noting private litigation’s role in enforcing national 
public policies in the United States, as opposed to greater administrative agency participation and 
safety nets doing the same in other Western democracies); id. at 397 n.80 (noting “the place in our 
country . . . [for] private litigation to effectuate public norms”); see also Paul D. Carrington, 
Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997) (“[D]iscovery is the American alternative to the 
administrative state. . . . Unless corresponding new powers are conferred on public officers, 
constricting discovery would diminish the disincentives for lawless behavior across a wide spectrum of 
forbidden conduct.”). 
 417. Yamamoto, supra note 42, at 390.  
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acceptable. It may be correct that some procedural rules—purely 
ministerial in nature—will affect cases alleging different substantive rights 
unequally.
418
 This is to be expected, given the differences in proof 
structures, evidentiary requirements, and nature of the claims 
themselves.
419
 There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this. 
The wrong occurs when a distinct class of claims and claimants—such 
as employment discrimination and civil rights claims and their litigants—
suffer disproportionately and consistently. This wrong is particularly 
problematic because it targets those substantive claims and claimants who 
should be afforded greater protection because of centuries-old and current 
subordination. Society has gone so far as to identify protected classes 
worthy of the greatest protection when government conduct threatens to 
deprive society’s most vulnerable members due process or equal 
protection. Ironically, the very beneficiaries of this heightened protection 
are deprived substantive relief because of procedural obstacles. 
Constitutional civil rights claims and federal statutory ones designed to 
protect outgroups become futile and empty gestures in the face of 
oppositional process. What one hands gives, the other takes away. 
Against this backdrop, the question of what side court interpretation 
should err on—maximum inclusion or greater efficiency—becomes easier. 
The former is the correct normative choice. This backdrop also reveals that 
the question itself is flawed. The judiciary must err on the side of 
democracy. Only then will a system of rule trans-substantivity be 
legitimate. 
B. Rulemakers’ Analysis of Procedural Disparate Impact on Substantive 
Rights 
Second, the civil rulemaking process can play a meaningful role in 
preserving the integrity of trans-substantivity by adopting a disparate 
impact test similar to the one used in Title VII litigation. Congress and the 
Supreme Court have developed a framework for assessing when neutral 
laws that disproportionately deny employment opportunities to protected 
individuals are illegal.
420
 This test for ferreting out laws that are fair in 
form, but discriminatory in practice, can serve as a model for the Advisory 
 
 
 418. Id. at 397–98. 
 419. Marcus, supra note 1, at 423. 
 420. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e et. seq. (2006)) (clarifying and codifying disparate impact theory for Title 
VII cases); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (establishing disparate impact 
theory for Title VII cases). 
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Committee’s own assessment of when Rules that have a similar impact 
should be rejected or amended. The rulemaking process could create a 
presumption of illegitimacy for civil procedural rules that have a 
disproportionate negative impact on workplace discrimination and other 
civil rights claims. The Advisory Committee—as designer, architect and 
gatekeeper of the Rules—is positioned to make a distinct impact as the 
danger and demise of rule trans-substantivity looms larger. 
C. Congressional Corrective Legislation 
Finally, it may be time again for Congress to draft curative legislation 
to reign in the restrictive ethos that permeates modern judicial rule 
interpretation and application. Like the Civil Rights Act of 1991—which 
addressed a myriad of cramped Supreme Court interpretations of the 
Federal Rules that had a disparate adverse impact on Title VII cases under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964
421—ameliorative legislation may be 
warranted at this juncture. The pendulum has swung so far from the liberal 
to restrictive ethos that a course correction is in order. Not only are the 
Federal Rules the subject of increased reflection and scrutiny at their 
seventy-fifth anniversary, but so are a number of federal civil rights 
statutes at similar seminal anniversaries.
422
 Retrospects of such civil rights 
statutes should include an appraisal of the civil rule system’s impact on the 
realization of substantive rights. In the absence of judicial restraint, 
Congress may be forced to pull the pendulum back to the original intent of 
the Rules’ drafters. Such course correction would minimize the harm to 
discrimination cases and reclaim trans-substantivity’s legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article continues an important conversation about the role of 
trans-substantivity in the federal civil court system and in a democracy. 
Given the myriad ways that trans-substantivity disfavors discrimination 
claims, it is time for the bench, bar, and public to reconsider the propriety 
of this time-honored principle and to fashion creative solutions to preserve 
its legitimacy. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Rules would call for a 
 
 
 421. See Leigh Anne Gilbert Hodge, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Legislative Response to the 
Supreme Court’s Weakening of Civil Rights Remedies in the Workplace, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 801 
(1992); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801 (1992). 
 422. For example, there have been commemorations for the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the sixtieth 
anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education. 
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diamond jubilee. However, given how flawed the language, application, 
and interpretation of the Rules can be for those challenging discriminatory 
conduct, it is clear that the Rules are still diamonds in the rough. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/8
